CALL FOR JUDGEMENT ARCHIVE (386-400)

By CFJ 390, this CFJ does not exist. It is here only to keep the records available, should we later decide differently.

Statement:

If a CFJ Statement does not meet the requirements of a Paradox Win CFJ it is not a Paradox Win CFJ, regardless of any claims to the contrary in the Statement or Reasoning of that CFJ.

Rule 601 (Winning By Paradox) states, in full: "A call for judgement whose statement alleges that further play is impossible, that changing the rules is impossible, or that a player action which would affect the game state appears equally legal and illegal is a "Paradox Win CFJ." Only those CFJs so specified by the rules are Paradox Win CFJs. When it ceases to be legal to appeal a particular Paradox Win CFJ, if the final verdict is true, and the player who submitted the CFJ is a voting player at that time, then that player wins the cycle. "

Note that the Rule refers to the Statement of the CFJ, not the Reasoning. Also, note that only the above stated conditions make the CFJ a "Paradox Win CFJ", with no mention of use of the phrase "Paradox Win CFJ" making any difference. Specific referrence to a CFJ's Statement is not coincidental nor accidental; for Rule 211 (Invoking Judgement) states, in part: "Any CFJ must include a single, clear, and clearly labeled statement that can be answered TRUE, or FALSE. The remainder of the CFJ may consist of alternate material to bolster one decision or another. The judge is required only to consider the actual statement provided and the current ruleset. " This clearly means that nothing contained in the Reasoning portion of a CFJ is mandated to have any effect on the subsequent ruling on the CFJ or its disposition.

Please note, also, that Rule 211 aditionally states: "CFJ's with no clear statement, or consisting of empty statements or inherently contradictory statements or multiple statements, in the judgement of the Judge, shall be judged "Invalid". It is even possible, from the above, that a CFJ containing a Statement that does not meet the criteria for a "Parafdox Win CFJ" and yet contains the phrase "This is a Paradox Win CFJ" in the same Statement (or even possibly in the Reasoning) could well be mandated a judgement of Invalid as inherently contradictory.

By CFJ 390, this CFJ does not exist. It is here only to keep the records available, should we later decide differently.

Statement:

The refusal of mr cwm to publish a correction of the statement in the May 29 issue of is is a player action which would affect the game state that appears equally legal and illegal.

From R601: "It is a Crime for a Player to refuse to publish, in a newspaper he or she owns, a correction of an untrue statement that previously appeared in that newspaper, after a public request for such a correction has been made."

The statement in the May 29 issue of is: "In a move believed unprecedented in the annals of Ackanomian journalism, and with one eye fixed firmly on the calender, is today publishes this statement, which is untrue."

It should be easy to verify that both a request for correction and a refusal have been posted publically.

I contend that this refusal to publish a correction affects the game state, as, if it is a Crime, the player may be subject to a TRUE verdict and penalties in a CFCJ alleging that the player has committed a Crime, while if it is not a Crime, the player is not subject to such a verdict and penalties.

The refusal is, however, only a Crime (and therefore illegal) if the statement for which correction has been requested is untrue. If the statement is not untrue, refusal is not a Crime (and therefore legal).

It should (and almost certainly has) been noted that the statement for which correction has been requested is the Liar's Paradox. If we assume the statement is untrue (and the refusal therefore illegal), then what is untrue is that the statement is untrue, making it not-untrue (and the refusal therefore legal). On the other hand (and I'm sure the Judge can see this coming) if we assume the statement is true (and the refusal therefore legal), then what is true is that the statement is untrue (and the refual therefore illegal). Since assumptions of legality lead to illegality, and assumptions of illegality lead to legality, I contend that the refusal appears equally legal and illegal.

"This is a Paradox Win CFJ."

By CFJ 390, this CFJ does not exist. It is here only to keep the records available, should we later decide differently.

Statement:

A Judge delivering a verdict of TRUE on a CFCJ whose statement was "mr cwm has committed a Crime" is a player action affecting the game state which appears equally legal and illegal.

The argument of my immediately previous CFJ demonstrates convincingly that the action of mr cwm refusing to publish a correction to the May 29 issue of is is equally a Crime and not a Crime, even if it is less convincing that it demonstrates that the action is both legal and illegal.

Since a Judge must deliver a verdict in accord with the Rules, a verdict of TRUE would be legal if the action in question was a Crime, while a verdict of TRUE would be illegal if the action in question had not been a Crime. Since the action appears equally a Crime and not a Crime, a verdict of TRUE appears equally legal and illegal.

By CFJ 390, this CFJ does not exist. It is here only to keep the records available, should we later decide differently.

Statement:

A player finding a treasure which has not yet been buried appears equally legal and illegal.

Well, just _look_ at it. Is it legal or illegal? Can you tell? I can't. Although, if it's legal, I already have the Chartreuse Goose (sneering).

Call For Judgement 390 - Sat, 17 May 1997 19:37:01 -0400
Subject: Acting Functional Officers
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Mohammed (selected Jun 01, 1997, 13:10h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Exactly one of the statements labelled "A" and "B" in the reasoning to follow are TRUE.

A: Mr. Nacho ceased being acting Clerk of the Courts upon Malenkai's return from vacation on May 31, 1997.

B: Mr. Nacho ceased being acting Clerk of the Courts upon Niccolo Flychuck becoming President on May 30, 1997.

There are two completly different points of law support A or B. If the judge finds TRUE, hopefully he can tell us whether A or B is true. If not, another CFJ will be required, but at least we can *try* to do it in one CFJ. Although this CFJ is in response to a specific case, the interpretation it provides will have general implications.

===

A is supported by "breadbox's interpretation", which I will quote, including my rebuttal, for the benefit of the judge:

> breadbox wrote:

> > > Speaking of which, on the surface there appears to me to be somewhat
> > > of a sticky tangle in the justice system at the moment.

> > One possible escape from this situation might be worthy of
> > consideration. I quote from Rule 403:
> >
> > (iv)   Whenever a Functional Office has a vacant Seat, and there
> >        is no Acting Officer for that Seat, the President is
> >        to be the Acting Officer for that Seat.
> >
> > An acceptable interpretation might be that at the time that Mr. Nacho
> > resigned as President, there was in fact an Acting Officer for that
> > seat, i.e., Mr. Nacho.
>
> This would be fine if the President *appointed* an acting officer,
> (or appointed himself) at the time.  In reality, however, the appointment
> was accepted by default of the office of President, and would seem
> to float with the office of President, in the absence of an explicit
> appointment.  That is the clear interpretation of the office rules
> to me.
>
> This interpretation comes from how we have customarily handled this in
> the past.  When Wayne quit, I became acting Tabulator, etc, because I
> was Acting Appointer at the time.  While I was acting Appointer, a
> proposal passed eliminating the Appointer office and assigning all
> the acting functional officer duties to the President (not in self-
> deleting {{}}'s, but with the language in the office rules today,
> including that which you quote).  At that time, all the FO duties were
> transferred to then President snowgod.  Furthermore, when the presidency
> was later transferred to Niccolo Flychuck, the FO duties went to him
> at that time as well -- two instances of game custom that are contrary
> to the above interpretation.  At that time, the transition was handled in
> the normal way, via election, and the rules stipulate(d) that snowgod
> remained *acting* president during the transition.  This case is different
> due to the resignation.

> Its possible that we did it wrong back then; game custom only holds sway
> when the rules are *unclear*, etc.  I'm afraid I may have to submit
> a CFJ on the matter, because as much as I'd like to, I cannot accept this
> interpretation without a judge diving into it more.

===

If A is TRUE, then B is FALSE. If A is FALSE, then B may be supported by a counnter-intuitive application of rule 401:

>   (vi) Term of Office: 

>         a) The Rules may specify a Term of Office, which is the amount
> of time a Player may hold an Office before his Term is considered to
> have expired. If the Rules fail to specify a Term for any Office, the
> Office is considered to have none, which is to say that the Term
> never expires.
>          b) When a Player's Term expires, he is no longer considered
> to be holding the Office. The Player performs the Office in an
> "Acting" role until the Seat is filled. 

Its a stretch, but one may allow Mr. Nacho's term to have "expired" upon his resignation. To me that is non-customary usage, but anything is possible. Given this rendering, Mr. Nacho would have been acting President up until the time of Niccolo Flychuck's assumption of the office, allowing B to be TRUE.

===

If A is TRUE, no CFJs will be affected. If B is TRUE, CFJ 384 is the only one to be affected, and that effect will be that its verdict has not yet been delivered. If the CFJ is FALSE, then CFJs 385-389 do not exist, and CFJ 379, 383, and 384 are affected in various ways, pretaining to reassignments and verdict delivery.

I accept Malenkai's rebuttal of A and see B as a stretchy interpretation of R401. I believe the duties fell to the Speaker, and CFJs 385-9 for this reason do not exist.

Call For Judgement 391 - Wed, 25 Jun 1997 20:31:06 -0400
Subject: Seeing Blue
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Robert Sevin (selected Jun 01, 1997, 14:01h EDT) (declined)
2nd Judge: Calvin N Hobbes (selected Jun 02, 1997, 19:22h EDT) (declined)
3rd Judge: Techno (selected Jun 02, 1997, 19:53h EDT) (declined)
4th Judge: two-star (selected Jun 03, 1997, 22:16h EDT) (declined)
5th Judge: Alfvaen (selected Jun 05, 1997, 20:02h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE at Thu, 05 Jun 1997 18:42:41 -0400
Appealed by: snowgod
Appeal Verdict: FALSE

Statement:

The Blueprint for the 'The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really' (Blue Thing) defines behaviour for a Gadget that could potentially break the rules, or could possibly be used to break the rules.

There exists an entity called 'Man Thin'. The Blue Thing's Blueprint specifies behaviour that would possibly allow someone to change the name of our esteemed Senator Melvin to this name, which would be a violation of rule 348.

Upon a verdict of TRUE, the Blueprint and all extant Blue Things are destroyed, as described in rule 594 with interpretation clarified by CFJ 261 (the last paragraph of CFJ 261's reasoning has been superceeded by rule change; the other relavent rules (viz 594 sec (ii)) and customs remain unsubstantially modified since CFJ 261 was delivered).

Here is the relevant paragraph from the Blue Thing's Blueprint:

"The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really is able to change the player name of any Ackanomic player to another name which is an anagram of the original. This is accomplished when the owner of The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really states publicly that he has pointed The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really at x (where x is the name of the player being renamed) and pressed the ENERGIZE button. The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really then gives the owner an anagram of the original name which he must post to the public forum."

Notice that in this Blueprint it does not say anything about how the particular anagram of the player's name is chosen after the Blue Thing is used on em. (Was this Blueprint submitted before "unambiguously specifying the Gadgets' behaviour" became a requirement?) Since the rules are silent, game custom seems to dictate that the player who owns the Blue Thing choose the anagram. There is certainly no built-in restriction in the Blueprint to keep a player from changing the name of another player(or emself)to a name which would violate Rule 348. (Rule 348 specifies that no two entities can have names that match; it does not, in itself, as I read it, prohibit changing an entity's name to match another's, though the results of such an action would certainly be illegal.)

Therefore, though it saddens my heart, I am forced to conclude that the Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really has a Blueprint which can potentially be used to violate the rules.

CFJ 361 is an earlier ruling that such a Blueprint should be destroyed. To be thorough, I checked on the modifications to Rule 594 since the ruling was delivered on CFJ 361. Malenkai is correct that the changes would not affect the verdict delivered there, so I am obliged to repeat it.

(Other Notes: with the recent amendments of R348, it would also be impossible, as I read the rules, for a Blue Thing to change a player's name to one of eir previous names unless e is wielding the Blue Thing emself. This may be a problem in R348 if any other name-changing device is created.)

{{[End of Judgement ]}}

[none]

From Rule 348: "No two named entities may have names that match.... An attempt to do anything that requires a name to be chosen [such as creating a Trinket or Organization] fails if the chosen name matches a name already in use."

An attempt to use The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really's power to change a name to an anagram clearly falls under the doman of the second quoted sentence above. If the anagram returned matches a name already in use, the second sentence states that the attempt "fails". Note that the rule does not forbid the attempt in and of itself. Quite the opposite: it describes what happens as a result. Furthermore, since such an attempt will fail, it is impossible for it to transgress the first sentence of Rule 348.

Thus, the Gadget known as The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Too Much, Really cannot be used to break the Rules.

The Court neglected to penalize the original judge, thus by rule the penalty is 1 point.

Call For Judgement 392 - Thu, 12 Jun 1997 19:08:49 -0400
Subject: Where's that pate?
Initiator: Bascule
Judge: Antimatter was here (selected Jun 02, 1997, 7:32h EDT) (declined)
2nd Judge: CarsesraC (selected Jun 02, 1997, 20:16h EDT) (failed to respond)
3rd Judge: Techno (selected Jun 06, 1997, 7:24h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE at Fri, 06 Jun 1997 21:39:53 -0400
Appealed by: Bascule
Appeal verdict: FALSE:

Statement:

For Bascule to give A$10 to Alfvaen is equally legal and illegal.

Bascule has two contracts binding his actions. The contracts demand that he gives A$10 to Alfvaen, and that he does not give any A$ to Alfvaen. There is no means for deciding precedence between contracts, and therefore the action of giving the A$ is equally legal and illegal.

The first contract:

"Bascule must give A$10 to Alfvaen"

The second contract:

"Bascule must not give any A$ to Alfvaen"

From Rule 1995:"Once a player has signed a contract, that player must obey any restrictions that that contract places on em"

The player _must obey_ any restrictions. This means that if I were to give A$10 to Alfvaen, this would be legal according to the first contract, but illegal according to the second. If I do not give any A$ to Alfvaen, this is illegal according to the first contract, but legal according to the second.

As the restrictions imposed by my two contracts are contradictory, the legality of my giving A$10 to Alfvaen is equally legal and illegal, since no precedence exists regarding contracts.

Sorry to be so lame, but my elegant example got nuked. And I wasted A$331.

In the form that this CFJ is stated, it would at first appear to me to be true. But after reading the rule concerning contracts (517/1) I believe it would be illegal to give the money and to not give the money. The contracts rule states the following...

Once a player has signed a contract, that player must obey any restrictions that that contract places on em; to do otherwise is a crime.

My reading of that statement tells me that it would be illegal to give the money because it would be illegal by contract 2. It would also be illegal to not pay the money as stated by contract 1. This CFJ states that it is both legal and illegal to give the money. My reading of the rule is that it would be illegal to do either.

I agree with the original judge that it is illegal to give or not give the A$ to Alfvaen. I submit that it is also legal. If a rule demands an action of a player, I believe that action has legality conferred upon it.

Example 1
---------

If R517 said:

"Once a player has signed a contract, that player must obey any restrictions that that contract places on em, _it is legal to obey such restrictions_; to do otherwise is a crime."

then I believe the CFJ would probably have been judged TRUE. Yet I believe that actions required of players must therefore also be legal.

Example 2
---------

A trivial example, from Rule 205:

"c) Players, acting in their capacity as officers, must announce all score changes they are responsible for notification of in the order which they are made aware the occurrence. They must do so in a timely manner."

If an officer, responsible for score changes, announces such a score change, we would say that such an action is legal. If another rule, hypothetical rule X, said:

"Players, acting in their capacity as officers, _may not_ announce all score changes they are responsible for notification of."

would we say that there is no precedence conflict here? Would we say that the officers must announce score changes, but that to do so was illegal? I argue that we would say that the rules conflict, and precedence should be applied to determine the legality or illegality of the notifications.

It is Legal To Perform a Required Action
----------------------------------------

R101 says:
"All players must always abide by all the rules then in effect"

R101 says I must abide by the rules. R517 says that I must obey my contracts. In obeying the contracts I would also be abiding by R517. Therefore to obey the contracts is legal.

Can Follows From Must
---------------------

A legal action within Acka is an action that is permitted, or an action that can happen. If an action must happen, then follows that that action _can_ happen (since it _must_ happen!)

Summary
-------

I believe that for an action to be required and yet be illegal is nonsensical. (For an action to be required and also be a crime is a different matter). If a rule requires an action, it also makes that action legal.

The Supreme Court finds the reasoning of the original Judge to be valid, but would like to note that while the contracts in question place Bascule in the position of necessarily committing a Crime, that is not necessarily the same, and in this case is not the same, as necessarily committing an illegality.

Penalty: [25 point penalty to] the Appealer for frivolously bothering the Judges.

Call For Judgement 393 - Fri, 13 Jun 1997 23:16:43 -0400
Subject: OMCL Trade
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: two-star (selected Jun 02, 1997, 7:36h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE at Sun, 08 Jun 1997 16:57:53 -0400
Appealed by: /dev/joe
Supreme Court's Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

/dev/joe did not in fact accept a trade of his vending machine for a Large Wooden Block, but was in fact a victim of an Orbital Mind Control Laser.

See Mohammed's message:

Date: Sun, 1 Jun 1997 22:08:51 -0500 (CDT)
From: Jason Orendorff 
To: Ackanomic 
Subject: Acka:  steal!

I am powering up my Orbital Mind Control Laser.  The zap-ee
is... /dev/joe.  I am zapping /dev for the trade Guy Fawkes recently
offered:  the Large Wooden Block for a Vending Machine.

This means the Add-On becomes unstrapped.

It has been remarked, of late, that the acceptance of a verdict can have interesting consequences, even if the verdict is overturned, as I expect this will be. I do believe I am party to a scam, in this case.

Although the Court does not necessarily disapprove of "scams", nevertheless it must look upon misuses of the judicial system with the utmost seriousness.

Or, in other words: nothing personal, but ...

Penalty to the original judge: 10 points.

Call For Judgement 394 - Tue, 03 Jun 1997 22:20:43 -0400
Subject: Liar's Paradox Paradox
Initiator: mr cwm
Judge: Antimatter was Here (selected Jun 02, 1997, 19:18h EDT) (declined)
2nd Judge: Alfvaen (selected Jun 02, 1997, 20:18h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

A Judge delivering a verdict of TRUE on a CFCJ whose statement was "mr cwm has committed a Crime" is a player action affecting the game state which appears equally legal and illegal.

From R601: "It is a Crime for a Player to refuse to publish, in a newspaper he or she owns, a correction of an untrue statement that previously appeared in that newspaper, after a public request for such a correction has been made."

The statement in the May 29 issue of is: "In a move believed unprecedented in the annals of Ackanomian journalism, and with one eye fixed firmly on the calendar, is today publishes this statement, which is untrue."

It should be easy to verify that both a request for correction and a refusal have been posted publically.

It should (and almost certainly has) been noted that the statement for which correction has been requested is the Liar's Paradox. If we assume the statement is untrue (making refusal to correct it a Crime), then what is untrue is that the statement is untrue, making it not-untrue (making refusal to correct it not a Crime). On the other hand (and I'm sure the Judge can see this coming) if we assume the statement is true (making the refusal to correct it not a Crime), then what is true is that the statement is untrue (making the refusal to correct it a Crime). Since assumptions of non-Criminality lead to Criminality, and assumptions of Criminality lead to non-Criminality, I contend that the refusal appears equally Criminal and non-Criminal.

Since a Judge must deliver a verdict in accord with the Rules, and the statement under consideration is "mr cwm has committed a Crime," a verdict of TRUE would be legal if the action in question was a Crime, while a verdict of TRUE would be illegal if the action in question had not been a Crime. Since the action appears equally a Crime and not a Crime, a verdict of TRUE appears equally legal and illegal. (In actuality, a Judge would most likely return a verdict of UNDECIDED in such a CFCJ, but that does not mean that a verdict of TRUE is not equally legal and illegal. Rather, likelihood of such a verdict is more evidence that a verdict of TRUE is equally legal and illegal, prompting it to be avoided.)

"This is a Paradox Win CFJ."

First let's examine whether or not the statement published by "is" is, in fact, untrue. The statement claims that it is untrue, but of course a statement is not necessarily fallible. Assuming for the moment a statement consists of an assertion of a single fact, it may be true(if that fact is indeed correct), or it may be false(if that fact is not correct). It may also be knowable or unknowable, depending on whether or not the correctness or incorrectness of the fact asserted in the statement can be known at the time the statement's truth value is to be determined.

For instance, a statement that "Alfvaen is President" is false; a statement that "Alfvaen is AckaPhysicist" is true; but a statement that "Alfvaen will never be President" is unknowable. It is possible for a statement in the latter category to be forever unknowable; if I do become President it becomes false, but it is possible that it may never become true. Thus such a statement cannot be called "untrue" with finality.

Now let us take the statement "This statement is untrue". It adds a new dimension to matters, a self-referential one, because the fact it asserts depends on its own truth value. I contend that this statement cannot be untrue.

If we assume that "This statement is untrue", which I will call Statement P, is untrue, then the fact Statement P asserts becomes correct, and hence Statement P is true. This leads to a contradiction, so it cannot be the case that Statement P is untrue. (It can be similarly shown that Statement P is not true, because that also leads to a contradiction, but I leave that as an exercise to the student.)

If "true" and "untrue" are the only options, then perhaps a CFCJ on a refusal to retract Statement P's publication cannot be determined with finality. However, I contend that Statement P's truth value falls outside that bipolar range, into the category of "indeterminate". This may be included within "unknowable". In any case, since "indeterminate" statements cannot be untrue, it cannot be a crime to refuse to retract them, since that clause of Rule 925 only applies to untrue statements. And Statement P, or mr cwm's permutation of it, however much it asserts its own untruthfulness, cannot in finality be considered "untrue", any more that it can be "true".

On the bright side, this means that a CFCJ can't be called against mr cwm anyways; all he gets is the Chartreuse Goose.

{{[End of reasoning]}}

Call For Judgement 395 - Fri, 13 Jun 1997 23:05:14 -0400
Subject: Cheap Trinkets
Initiator: Antimatter was Here
Judge: You can call me Al (selected Jun 03, 1997, 8:51h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE at Tue, 03 Jun 1997 22:25:15 -0400
Appealed by: Red Barn
Appeal Verdict: FALSE
Statement:

Antimatter was here spent a total of A$1 creating the 100 Really Cheap Trinkets.

Rule 506 does not prevent the creation of trinkets with a value of less than A$1. Since I created all of these trinkets simultaneously, the transfer is obviously made simultaneously. Rule 505 would then round it up, except it is already exactly A$1.

Also, the R506 takes precedence over R505 due to a clause in R505, so it is possible that no rounding takes place in the creation or destruction of trinkets anyways.

I decided to give this one a shot - it wasn't as user-unfriendly as the other CFJ's I've been handed lately! :vp But the problem, as AwH states it, is that there's nothing in the rules that says that decimal values can't be used. However, rule 505 says (my emphasis):

"IV. No Ackapennies:

     A$ may not be broken into fractional AckaDollars. If the Rules specify
a transfer should be made that
     ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
includes a fractional reckoning of A$, the transaction will instead be
conducted in an integer number of A$, and the rounding shall be in favor of
the Player or entity receiving A$. "

Also, each entity has to be unique. This creation, as I see it, does not create a "batch", but 100 unique entities. Each one is a transfer, as I see it, of A$.01...so it would seem that each one needs to be rounded up to A$1. If I'm wrong, then so be it. But I'd rather not see the precedent of an obvious rule break being set. There are no Ackapennies - each Trinket's price is A$1 or more.

That's it? That's it.

[none]

Antimatter was here wants to have 100 separate trinkets, and at the same time wants the Treasury to treat them a single entity when e creates them. The fact that the sum total of Ackadollars transferred at the end of the operation is integral does not alter the fact that Ackapennies would have to be involved to create any of these trinkets.

Rule 506 says: "A player may create a Trinket by publically announcing its name, description, and value...". If the rule had allowed a player to create "one or more" trinkets, the Court might have had to reconsider. As it stands, nothing in the rules encourages the view that the action in question would not require 100 discrete steps.

Finally, the Court wishes to note in the reasoning of the original judge, it was hypothesized that the trinkets would be succesfully created with a value of A$1 each, based upon Rule 505. The quoted clause, however, refers to transfers specified by Rules, not players. The Court finds it more likely that the attempted creations simply fail to occur.

Call For Judgement 396 - Wed, 11 Jun 1997 20:41:16 -0400
Subject: Trinket Creation
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Atilla the Pun (selected Jun 03, 1997, 22:36h EDT) (declined)
2nd Judge: Guy Fawkes (selected Jun 05, 1997, 18:53h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

mr cwm did not create the Haddocks' Eyes Locket.

The trinket in question was created because mr cwm was granted a Boon of The Ancients. Rule 1211 specifies that the player granted the Boon Must Describe a trinket bestowed thereby. The trinket's actual creation is the result of the player's actions--it cannot take place until after the trinket is described--but nowhere does it state that the player actually creates the trinket. The trinket is created with money from the Treasury, not the player's own money, as it would be if the player had created it. Nowhere in Rule 1211 or Rule 506 does it specify who, or what, is the creator of a trinket not created specifically by a player's declaration(as in the third paragraph of R506).

Therefore, a trinket bestowed by a Boon of The Ancients is not created by the player who received the Boon, nor in fact by any other player. In fact, the term "creator of the Haddocks' Eyes Locket" may well be meaningless under the current ruleset, or at the very least not correspond to any existing entity. (Perhaps Rule 1211 was the creator of the trinket.)

In any case, if at any time a rule is to specify that "A trinket is returned to its creator", and this CFJ is judged TRUE, then there should be some provision for dealing with rule-created trinkets.

Rule 506 "Trinkets" states that a Trinket may be created by a player action or by the Rules. Its third paragraph gives a means by which a player may create a Trinket, and so it regulates the player creation of Trinkets. mr cwm did not follow these guidlines when created the Haddock's Eyes trinket, and so he did not create it.

The judge finds the initiator's speculation that Rule 1211 was the creator of the Trinket to be a strong possibility. Rule 506 does admit the possibiblity of the Rules creating Trinkets, and Rule 1211 states conditions under which a Trinket may be created as a Boon of the Ancients. Therefore, the judge finds that Haddock's Eyes (is that really the name of the Trinket, or simply what it is called?) was created by the Rules rather than by a player.

Call For Judgement 397 - Thu, 12 Jun 1997 19:02:06 -0400
Subject: The infamous invisible SVH
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Calvin N Hobbes (selected Jun 03, 1997, 22:51h EDT) (declined)
2nd Judge: ThinMan (selected Jun 05, 1997, 18:48h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

When Malenkai returned from his recent vacation, Malenkai did not have a duty to select a Mad Hatter for Malenkai for that vacation.

From R 927:

> Whenever a player has remained on a voluntarily activated vacation for
> a period exceeding 14 days (and is not already wearing a Silly
> Vacation Hat), the Officer in charge of random things shall randomly
> select an active player (hereafter known as a Mad Hatter) to design a
> Silly Vacation Hat for the vacationing player.

After returning, the player is no longer the "vacationing player". Also, after returning, the player has not "remained on [...] vacation". It seems that there is no duty to assign a Mad Hatter for a player who is not on vacation.

OTOH, the previous Officer in charge of random things *did* have a duty. Does said duty remain with the player or the office? Even if it does stay with the office, it would seem to be voided by the previous paragraph. It seems like an uncorrectable corruption of the game state to me, but lets see what the Judge thinks. I certainly apologize for not spending the normal of time delving into this (rather interesting, IMO) issue.

In CFJ 401 I argued for officer duties being bound to the player holding the office, rather than being an "accessory" or tool of the office itself. This CFJ allows me the opportunity to argue for some degree of restriction of that principle. In my opinion, duties, priveleges, and restrictions associated with offices, though attributable to the player who holds the office, do, in fact, "move" when the office is transferred. The underlying principle that unifies these concepts is that the name of an office is a sort of alias for the person who holds that office. There is, indeed, precedent for this interpretation (c.f. AOJ 101 and CFJ 153). When an office is transferred, the alias begins referring to a different player, but it is my opinion that this is transparent as far as the rules are concerned.

I concur with Malenkai, however, about the OICRT's duty no longer being applicable now that he has returned from vacation. I imagine I could pick apart the language of R927 sufficiently finely to construct an argument for the opposite position, but I don't see that as useful in this circumstance, and it is questionable whether it would stand up to an appeal.

Call For Judgement 398 - Sat, 07 Jun 1997 10:47:14 -0400
Subject: Literature Scoring
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Vynd (selected Jun 05, 1997, 18:57h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

When a proposal that is Literature passes, the point value specified in Rule 2010, "Literature", section II, is in addition to any other points the author of that proposal would have received had the proposal not been Literature.

Rule 2010 contains what I feel is an ambiguous wording: "Whenever a proposal that is literature passes, its author gains X points.", where X is specified in the next sentence. This could be read as saying that those are the only points received by the author of the proposal, and this would be disregarded in favour of R207, which would have precedence. I think that game custom would dictate that a Literature proposal should receive the R2010 points in addition to R207(or R209) points. If this CFJ is ruled FALSE, an amendment of R2010 is doubtless in order.

I judge this CFJ to be TRUE. The only arguement against this is that of precedence, and it doesn't really hold here. Precedence only comes into play if there is a conflict between two rules, and there is no conflict here. While Rule 207 (and others high in the rule set) specify point awards for certain events and or types of proposals, they do not exclude additional point gains, or penalties, mandated by lower precedence rules. This is supported by the game custom surrounding Silly proposals, whose author's "score 5 points."

Call For Judgement 399 - Fri, 13 Jun 1997 19:21:50 -0400
Subject: Auction
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Bascule (selected Jun 07, 1997, 00:26h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

It is permissible under the Rules to call a single Auction to auction off a group of objects that do not all have the same value or description, without having to do so as a single lot.

There is nothing in Rule 516, "Auctions", to prohibit such an action. It does not even implicitly state that an Auction can only be called for a single type of object only. "1 item" is a default quantity for an auction, but then the Speaker is the default Auctioneer, too, so it should only hold if there is no other specification. The requirement that a single minimum bid be specified might be problematic if a group of items widely disparate in value are auctioned, but it is not an absolute prohibition. If disparate-item Auctions are not held, is it merely because nobody thinks to do so? Does that amount to "game custom"?

From Rule 516:

"b) if more than one item is being auctioned, whether or not the items should be grouped and auctioned as a lot (default = no)."

"The players who made the N highest qualified bids shall each receive an item in exchange for the amount of A$ they bid."

The rules do not specify that multiple item auctions must have the same value or description. Therefore I judge this CFJ TRUE.

As /dev/joe has observed, the Officer in charge of Random Things should step in to decide who gets what. From Rule 405:

"When the rules require one of a set of distinct objects to be chosen or operated on without specifying how one is to be chosen, the Officer in charge of random things shall choose one of the possible choices at random, with equal probabilities for all possible choices."

Call For Judgement 400 - Mon, 09 Jun 1997 19:35:43 -0400
Subject: Last-Ditch Effort
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: ThinMan (selected Jun 07, 1997, 15:27h EDT)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Malenkai's attempt to create his Blueprint for the Cheez-Whiz failed.

In Rule 594, "Blueprints", it states the following:

An attempt to create a new Blueprint fails if its text does not a)introduce exactly one new kind of Gadget, b)name the new Gadget type, and c)unambiguously define the behaviour of such a gadget.

Below is the text of the submitted Blueprint:

> The Cheez-Whiz is a small pyramid.  3 of its sides are white, whilst
> the 4th is black.  A Cheez-Whiz will transfer all of its owner's
> Ackadollars to the Treasury if its owner legally chews the Gumball.
> It is said that the Cheez-Whiz can also be used to help find long
> lost Treasure.
>
> All sentences that follow this one are, or describe, attributes
> of grapefruit, and they conflict with this one.

I content that the last sentence of the second paragraph "It is said that the Cheez-Whiz can also be used to help find long lost Treasure", does not unambiguously define the Cheez-Whiz's behaviour. The statement is in and of itself ambiguous about the Cheez-Whiz's treasure-finding capabilities, so the behaviour of the Gadget in this respect is ambiguous.

{{[End of Reasoning]}}

The ambiguity clause of R594 applies to the entire blueprint, not to individual sentences. In any case, I do not find that the sentence in question necessarilly implies any behavior at all. In my judgement, Malenkai's creation of the blueprint for Cheez-Whiz is legal and successful.

I deduce that Malenkai has managed to scam another win. He seems to be returning to his old ways. (Which, I will add, _were_ rather more colorful.) I always was against "winning by Frankenstein Monster."

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