CALL FOR JUDGEMENT ARCHIVE (251-265)

Call For Judgement 251 - Fri, 23 Aug 1996 09:57:54 -0400
Subject: Contracts II
Initiator: ThinMan
Judge: Bascule (selected Aug 02, 1996, 18:50h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE at Mon, 05 Aug 1996 19:45:59 -0400
Appealed by /dev/joe at Mon, 5 Aug 1996 23:05 CDT
Supreme Court's Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The contract between /dev/joe and this is not a name that /dev/joe announced on Wed, 31 Jul 1996 no longer exists.

I shall argue that the contract contains one or more provisions that are not on listed in R514, section (ii). If this is the case, then by R 514 the contract was not ever enforceable. Again by R 514, non-enforceable contracts are immediately destroyed. Thus the contract in question was destroyed as soon as it was formed.

I quote the contract:

>"At all times until 00:00 EDT September 1, 1996, all A$ held by players
>other than this is not a name and /dev/joe are transferred to this is not
>a name and /dev/joe (split evenly between them; in the case of an odd
>amount of A$, the first odd A$ transferred by this contract goes to
>/dev/joe, the next to this is not a name, and so on, alternating).  On all
>proposals where /dev/joe and this is not a name vote the same way, all
>other players are required to vote that way also."

And R 514, section (ii):

>    (ii) A Contract is Enforceable iff the behaviours it regulates are
>    among the following list:
>
>    a) The transfer of currency from Player to Player
>    b) A vote of YES or NO on one or more Proposals by Player
>    c) The transfer of an Ackanomic entity

The key word here is "regulates." The contract seeks to cause or perform, rather than regulate, several currency transfers. The distinction is fine, but important. It would be regulation if the contract said "Each player other than /dev/joe and this is not a name must transfer [etc.]." No rule assigns contracts any authority to directly cause currency transfers; the best that they are allowed to do is to attempt to regulate such behavior. Moreover, it seems to me that the only effects that such attempted regulation has is to produce penalties for certain violations.

ThinMan's reasoning is fine. I wonder if the contract ever existed though.

>From R514:

> The Contract is considered to exist at such time as the appropriate
> Officer has received identical copies of the proposed Contract from
> each Player involved along with each Player's consent to abide by the
> Contract.

from the contract:

> all A$ held by players other than this is not a name and /dev/joe

As one of the players who is not this is not a name or /dev/joe, I could be said to be involved in the contract, and I have no recollection of sending a copy of the contract to the File Clerk along with consent to abide by it.

ThinMan's argument rests on the belief that the word "regulate", as used in R514 (ii), only means "restrict" or "require", and specifically that it cannot mean "cause" or "perform". However, CFJ 113 and numerous other CFJs have established the game custom that a rule which causes or performs some action can be said to regulate that action, as the word "regulate" is used in Rule 115.

The judge presented only one other possible argument, which has already been specifically invalidated by CFJ 249.

The Supreme Court rules that the contract /dev/joe and this is not a name tried to form never existed.

From 514 i (now repealed)

The Contract is considered to exist at such time as the appropriate Officer has received identical copies of the proposed Contract from each Player involved along with each Player's consent to abide by the Contract.

As the contract involved more players than /dev/joe and tinan, through transferring their money to /dev/joe and tinan, and these players did not send consent to abide by the contract to the File Clerk, the contract never existed.

Call For Judgement 252 - Sat, 03 Aug 1996 00:22:36 -0400
Subject: Contracts III
Initiator: ThinMan
Judge: /dev/joe (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Malenkai (selected Aug 02, 1996, 19:42h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

No contract has legal authority to directly cause any transfer of currency, although it may require players to transfer currency among themselves.

Currency is protected, so may not be manipulated except as the Rules specify. No Rule allows a contract to transfer currency in any way. Rule 514 may allow a contract to "require" one player to transfer currency to another, but the contract itself may not perform such a transfer.

ThinMan's reasoning is unassailable. The statement on which judgement was called is TRUE.

Call For Judgement 253 - Sun, 11 Aug 1996 12:29:32 -0400
Subject: Hey, you can't do that
Initiator: Brinjal
Judge: /dev/joe (selected Aug 02, 1996, 18:58h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The contract between this is not a name and /dev/joe is non-Enforceable

:From Rule 514:

> (iii) A Contract is not Enforceable if any behaviour it
> regulates violates any of the rules.
>
> (iv)  A Contract ceases to exist immediately upon being
> non-Enforceable.

The final sentence of the contract states that:

> "On all proposals where /dev/joe and this is not a name vote the same
>  way, all other players are required to vote that way also."

Even without the vacation rule we have at least one player currently in gaol who is prohibited from voting. In requiring such a player to vote, this contract is attempting to oblige a player to commit an illegal act. This is a direct breach of part (iii) of rule 514. Thus by R514 (iv) the contract immediately ceases to exist.

I also note that transferring A$ while in Gaol is probably also illegal, but that is a moot point if the reasoning above is accepted.

If the contract is Enforceable, then the correct verdict is FALSE. If the contract was non-Enforceable, then by Rule 514, it ceased to exist immediately upon being non-Enforceable, and so did not exist when this CFJ was submitted, and this CFJ is false because it refers to the contract as having some property in the present tense. "The contract *was* non-Enforceable" might have been judged differently.

Until I realized the above, I was going to judge this UNDECIDED, since the statement of this CFJ is very similar as that of CFJ 251, which is currently in the supreme court. CFJ 251's statement is also a better way to write the statement of this CFJ.

The initiator of this CFJ supplies a different reasoning that that supplied in CFJ 251; I have commented on 251's reasoning already. The reasoning supplied with this CFJ depends on the verdict for CFJ 256. The supreme court should consider this CFJ's reasoning in judging CFJ 251. If CFJ 256 is TRUE, CFJ 251 is undecidable and perhaps should be judged INVALID. If CFJ 256 is FALSE, the reasoning should determine if this CFJ's reasoning is valid, which may determine the verdict for CFJ 251.

Call For Judgement 254 - Tue, 06 Aug 1996 21:57:15 -0400
Subject: Gaolgod
Initiator: snowgod
Judge: De'ghew (selected Aug 02, 1996, 19:06h New York Time) (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Habeous Corpus (selected Aug 05, 1996, 19:17h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

snowgod was released from the Gaol as soon as the Supreme Court overturned CFCJ 107

[none - CotC]

The first to hit me was that the Acting Gaoler did not have the authority to release snowgod early, even with the Supreme Court ruling or even if the president had pardoned em. Rule 712 states that one of the privileges of the Gaoler is to release prisoners early. It does not state whether this privilege is tied to bribes or any other reason to release a prisoner before eir sentence is completed. Since Rule 609 says that an Acting Gaoler has NO privileges granted the Gaoler, e cannot release a prisoner early. Period.

The next thing that struck me over the head was, to the best of my recollection, that while the Supreme Court did overturn the guilty verdict {TRUE}, there was no mention in the ruling about releasing snowgod. As the Gaol is a Protected Entity, I'm not sure that such wording in the ruling would have had any validity anyway.

Therefore, I find that the statement is FALSE.

Call For Judgement 255 - Mon, 05 Aug 1996 18:31 EDT
Subject: Paying the Acting Gaoler
Initiator: snowgod
Judge: ThinMan (selected Aug 02, 1996, 19:10h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The acting Gaoler must be paid for his services.

From R609: The Rules may specify conditions under which a Player serves in an Office in an "Acting" capacity. In such a case, the Player is responsible for performing all of the Duties without receiving any of the Privileges of the Office.

R712/3 section (iv) (Gaoler) states that The Privileges are:

a) To receive NO salary.
b) To be able to accept bribes of currency from players in the Gaol.

Since it is a privilege of the Gaoler to "recieve NO salary" and acting officers are not entitled to the privileges of office, any player who serves as acting gaoler must be paid. How much he should be paid is a matter for another CFJ.

At first glance, it would appear that snowgod is correct -- the acting Gaoler may not receive no salary, for that is a privilege of the Gaoler.

What salary, however, should be paid to the acting Gaoler? The salaries for functional officers are defined in Rule 612, but Rule 712 claims precedence over rule 612. Moreover, receipt of no salary does not seem to meet the definition of "privilege" established by R 609. Rule 609 has precedence over Rule 712, so it is possible that receiving no salary is not a privilege of the Gaoler after all.

The most consistent interpretation that I can see is that R 712/3 section (iv) (a) does not define a privilege per se, but rather it redefines a parameter of the salary privilege of functional officers. That is, section (iv) (a) is equivalent to "the salary of the Gaoler is zero." This makes the provision consistent with the definition of "privilege" in R 609 while preserving the apparent intent of the clause and clarifying the salary to be received by the Gaoler.

This Court chooses to not distinguish between making a payment of zero and making no payment at all, so it no longer matters whether or not the salary is a privilege of the Gaoler.

Call For Judgement 256 - Fri, 23 Aug 1996 10:05:47 -0400
Subject: Contractual Paradox
Initiator: ThinMan
Judge: De'ghew (selected Aug 02, 1996, 19:13h New York Time) (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected Aug 05, 1996, 19:20h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE at Tue, 06 Aug 1996 08:51:25 -0400
Appealed by ThinMan at Tue, 6 Aug 1996 13:29:52 -0500
Supreme Court's Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The legality of the File Clerk demanding a filing fee from two players who form a contract whose only provision is that they transfer a Blue Cross between themselves cannot be determined with finality.

All Ackanomic actions are protected unless otherwise specified in the Rules, so the File Clerk may only legally demand filing fees if the Rules specifically so allow. The rules only allow such action when players form an Enforceable Contract (R607). The legality of the File Clerk demanding a filing fee from players who form a contract depends, therefore, on whether or not the contract is Enforceable.

According to R514,

>    (ii) A Contract is Enforceable iff the behaviours it regulates are
>    among the following list:
>
>    a) The transfer of currency from Player to Player
>    b) A vote of YES or NO on one or more Proposals by Player
>    c) The transfer of an Ackanomic entity

A Blue Cross is an Ackanomic entity, so a contract whose only provision is that one player transfer a Blue Cross to the other is Enforceable according to R 514, section (ii)(c).

However, R514 also says:

>    (iii) A Contract is not Enforceable if any behaviour it regulates
>    violates any of the rules.

R 549 forbids the transfer of Blue Crosses between players, so a contract containing a provision that one player transfer a Blue Cross to another player is not Enforceable according to R 514, section (iii).

R 514 does not indicate that section (ii) supersedes section (iii), nor that section (iii) superceeds section (ii), so it cannot be determined with finality whether or not the contract described is Enforceable.

Since it cannot be determined with finality whether or not the contract is Enforceable, it cannot be determined with finality whether or not it is legal for the File Clerk to demand a filing fee from players who form such a contract.

If this CFJ is judged TRUE, then its initiator (ThinMan) shall win the game according to rule 219.

There is no precedence issue. Both section (ii) and section (iii) dictate which contracts are enforceable, and contracts must adhere to both. Therefore it can be determined with finality that said contract is illegal, and my judgement is FALSE.

The original judge's verdict is not consistent with R 514. Indeed, he seems to make my case for me when he says that contracts must adhere to both sections (ii) and (iii) of Rule 514.

Section (ii) does not say that a contract "'may be' Enforceable if [...]," rather it says that a contract "_is_ Enforceable iff [...]" (emphasis mine). According to the criteria of section (ii), my hypothetical contract is Enforceable. Section (ii) does not make any provision for this determination to be superceded.

There is no disagreement that section (iii) _says_ that the contract is not Enforceable. However, to say that therefore the contract is not Enforceable is to ignore section (ii) which says that the contract _is_ Enforceable. It is incorrect to judge that the hypothetical contract is not Enforceable. Section (iii) also does not provide for its determination of non-Enforceability to be superceded, however, so it is also not correct to judge that the contract _is_ Enforceable. R 514 is internally inconsistent on whether or not the contract is Enforceable.

I realize that the above is basically a recap of my original argument, but I don't think there is any basis for disagreeing with it, and I think it is pretty self-contained. I don't think that Mr Flychuck considered the matter with sufficient care; perhaps he wrote his decision at a late hour, and his normally-good judgement was impaired.

Throught the argument in the public forum after the verdict has been handed down, it has been established that the rules are silent, and/or unclear on the matter of resolving the internal precedence conflict of R 514. The issue of extant game custom has come up, and there has been some question as to what, if any, such custom exists. I wish to bring to the Court's attention implicit game custom established in the reasoning of CFJ 240 by Judge ThinMan:

> In my judgement, it is in the Spirit of the Game that a reasonable
> reading of the Rules that does not produce a paradox is preferable to
> an otherwise similarly reasonable one that does.

My only request is that the Court consider this implicit game custom, in accordance with R 215, when reaching a verdict.

The Supreme Court recognises the paradox within the old rule 514. The Supreme Court can understand the original verdict and reasoning, as it believes that the rule was intended to be read in this way. However, the paradox exists in the way the rule was actually written.

Regarding Judgement 215, the Supreme Court regards ThinMan's reasoning to be more reasonable than the non-paradox reading of 514. If the Supreme Court believed the two readings to be equally reasonable, a verdict of False would have been returned.

Call For Judgement 257 - Sat, 03 Aug 1996 17:17:52 -0400
Subject: Contracts IV
Initiator: ThinMan
Judge: Simon Marty Harriman (selected Aug 02, 1996, 23:00h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

Rule 607 cannot cause a contract to be non-Enforceable.

R 514, section (ii), says:

>     (ii) A Contract is Enforceable iff the behaviours it regulates are
>     among the following list:
>
>     a) The transfer of currency from Player to Player
>     b) A vote of YES or NO on one or more Proposals by Player
>     c) The transfer of an Ackanomic entity

This section in no uncertain terms makes certain contracts Enforceable and others non-Enforceable.

this is not a name has invoked R 607 to demand a filing fee for the contract between Malenkai and me. Neither of us has paid it. R 607, section (iv), says that in such a case the relevant contract becomes non-Enforceable. However, that section of R 607 does not claim precedence over R 514. R 514 has precedence over R 607 by the numerical method, and therefore the conditions established in R 514 hold sway despite R 607.

this is not a name argued that by assigning an attribute (Enforceability) to contracts, R 514 implicitly defers to rules of lower precedence with regard to manipulation of that attribute. I see no merit whatsoever in that argument, but I include it for the sake of completeness. There is no basis in the rules for implicit precedence or deference, but there is a clear procedure for handling conflicts between rules.

this is not a name has also argued that the precedence claim in R 607, section (v) also applies to section (iv). Here is the relevant part of R 607:

>     (iv)  The Privileges are:
>
>           a) To receive the usual salary for a Functional Officer.
>
>           b) The right to demand receipt of a filing fee of 2 units
>              from each Player involved in an Enforceable Contract when
>              that Contract is submitted.  This transaction shall be
>              accomplished in the proper fashion.  If one or more
>              Players involved in the Contract cannot or will not
>              pay the fee, the Contract is deemed to be non-Enforceable.
>
>     (v)   An Acting File Clerk has the right to demand payment of the
>           filing fee.  This section takes precedence over all mutable
>           rules.

I see no reason to believe that the phrase "This section" in section (v) should apply to section (iv) as well. tinan's argument was based on both sections dealing with the filing fee, and hence actually being one "section." I reject that argument. The rule is clearly divided into separate sections, each denoted with its own Roman numeral. "This section" means the section denoted by Roman numeral (v).

I must rule true on this question as the rules do clearly state that the numerical value gives 514 precedence. However I believe that the original intent of 607 was to override 514 and this is a shameless abuse of a loophole. Needs fixin.

Call For Judgement 258 - Sun, 11 Aug 1996 09:56:44 -0400
Subject: Cash Flow Paradox
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: snowgod (selected Aug 02, 1996, 19:39h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The legality of /dev/joe calling a CFCJ cannot be determined with finality.

There are two contracts, both of which appear enforceable by CFJ 249 (unless the File Clerk's fee demand makes the second one non-Enforceable). One of these continually transfers all the money not in the treasury to this is not a name and /dev/joe, while the other continually transfers all money those players have to ThinMan and Malenkai. Therefore, all the money not in the treasury is continually being transferred between these players, and at any given moment it is uncertain whether /dev/joe has any A$. One of the requirements for submitting a CFCJ is paying a A$20 court fee to the Treasury; by the above reasoning it is unclear if such action is legal.

ThinMan wrote, in a message to the public forum:

>Now that CFJ 257 has been judged TRUE, /dev/joe's argument falls apart.  In
>particular, his statement that his and tinan's contract transfers money is
>wholly false.  Moreover, his statement that mine and Malenkai's contract
>transfers money is likewise incorrect.  /dev/joe and tinan are guilty of
>non-compliance, but there is no paradox.

Which sums up my feelings better than I could do myself.

Although I have some doubts as to if a paradox would have existed even if these contracts were enforcable. The act of transferring money appears occurs as soon as it is initiated. There is no time delay involed. Therefore, if the money is continuosly being transferred between the four players involved in contracts, at any given moment, each of those players would have all the money. Or at least, they would have all the money at some point in time during the calling of the CFCJ. A small sum of this money would then be removed from circulation and placed into the treasury while the rest continues transferring.

I, therefore, return a verdict of FALSE.

As a sidenote, the Court would like to apologize for being so late with this verdict. Seems the CFJ slipped under a cushion on the judge's sofa, and if he hadn't been digging around for change to buy some gum, the deadline might have slipped by unnoticed.

Call For Judgement 259 - Sat, 03 Aug 1996 14:31:05 -0400
Subject: Conditional Rule Changes
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Wayne (selected Aug 03, 1996, 02:12h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Rule changes similar to those described in the section below labelled "Example:" are valid, and have the stated effect, if adopted.

Example:

if R 729 exists, amend it to read, in full: "Malenkai's score doubles once every Tuesday".

Next section labelled something else:

I remember pTang sending things like this through the proposal queue, and remember thinking they were invalid, and remember lots of discussion.

The problem is, I can't remember the resolution. Perhaps the Judge will.

For a moment I thought that there may be a paradox here, but after careful interpretation of the statement I have made my judgement of False.

Conditional rule changes may be valid or invalid. It can only be determined at the time the rule change is evaluated. From R491/3:

"...A rule change is valid if it describes the creation of a new mutable rule, the amendment of an existing mutable rule, the repeal of an existing mutable rule, or a change of the mutability of any rule. Otherwise, the rule change is invalid."

In the Example:
if R 729 exists, amend it to read, in full: "Malenkai's score doubles once every Tuesday".

if R729 exists, then 729 is amended. This is a valid rule change. If R729 does not exist then nothing happens. This, according to R491, is not a valid rule change.

The Example is a valid PROPOSAL. It's validity as a rule change can only be determined once it becomes a rule change.

While such rule changes may be valid or invalid, I must rule that the statement given by Malenkai is FALSE. I have shown that they are not always valid.

Call For Judgement 260 - Mon, 05 Aug 1996 00:57:55 -0400
Subject: The office of Senate
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: /dev/joe (selected Aug 05, 1996, 00:26h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The ProConsul (Speaker) is not a Senator, and hence the ProConsul may hold a Senate seat, even if Proposal 1068 is adopted.

I think a verdict of TRUE is obvious. I know this was true back in March, when it was discussed, but there has been some private debate lately. From R 478:

>The Senate is an Office with four Seats, filled by Election for Office.
>The Speaker or Acting Speaker has the title of ProConsul and will be the
>head of the Senate. Only when a Senate vote is tied, the ProConsul will
>cast his vote to determine the outcome

Since we have (or at least had), 4 senators filling the 4 senate seats, *and* a ProConsul, this indicates the ProConsul is not a senator.

I am rendering "senator" here in the common sense, as "one who holds the office of senate". Technically, the name of the office is "senate".

As for P 1068, that will simply make so that a player may not hold more than one senate seat. If the above reasoning is valid, that part follows.

Malenkai's reasoning is flawless. The original Senate rule (see proposal 478 in the archives) named the players who held the senate office Senators, and disallowed voting for the Speaker or another Senator in an election for Senate. The effect of removing this language from the rule is being discovered now.

Call For Judgement 261 - Tue, 13 Aug 1996 18:48:39 -0400
Subject: Scientific Inquiry
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Brinjal (selected Aug 06, 1996, 23:30h New York Time) (failed to respond
2nd Judge: snowgod (selected Aug 10, 1996, 09:27h New York Time) (declined to judge)
3rd Judge: Habeous Corpus (selected Aug 10, 1996, 20:30h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

If a Blueprint is judged to create a Gadget who's behaviour could *potentially* break the Rules (or it could *possibly* be used to break the rules), the Blueprint is destroyed in accordance with R 594.

R 594 is not clear. I think it should be. In particular, the rendering of "conflict" in R 594 (ii) should be clarified.

Malenkai is right in eir reasoning, Rule 594 _is_ unclear in it's wording of paragraph (ii). However, from that wording, it can be reasonably implied that the purpose of the paragraph is to cover Blueprints that , as their main purpose or unavoidable side effect, WILL violate a Rule or set of Rules.

Unfortunately there is currently no protection against any Player using Gadgets to violate the Rules if, as a byproduct of the Blueprint's design, the designed behavior of the Gadget allows for such a use. This has the potential to lead to more than a few Paradoxes.

It is therefore _my_ interpretation that while the implicit meaning of R 594 (ii) is to cover the _designed_ behavior of a Blueprint, *potential* behavior may be used to invoke R 594 (ii) and destroy the Blueprint. Therefore Malenkai's Statement is TRUE.

I note, however, for the record that merely because a Blueprint is destroyed as a result of judgement on this issue, any Gadgets previously created based on the Blueprint are not destroyed at the same time. Gadgets themselves are Protected and governed by other Rules and do not even necessarily require a Blueprint to be created.

Call For Judgement 262 - Tue, 13 Aug 1996 19:51:27 -0400
Subject: Absentee legislation
Initiator: Wayne
Judge: Bascule (selected Aug 10, 1996, 09:08h New York Time) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: Malenkai (selected Aug 13, 1996, 09:22h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

A player on vacation cannot submit proposals to be distributed.

[none provided - CotC]

From R 457:

> The only thing a player on vacation may legally do is take himself off
> vacation, or perform any action permitted by an Immutable Rule.

This rule claims precedence over all mutable rules, except that it defers to rules pertaining to acting functional officers, in certain specific circumstances. There is no mutable rule which allows proposal submission and has precedence over this clause.

I find no Immutable rule that explicitly allows proposal submission by a player on vacation either. R 115 does not apply here as well.

Thus a player on vacation may not submit proposals, and thus the statement I was asked to judge is TRUE.

Call For Judgement 263 - Thu, 15 Aug 1996 20:38:21 -0400
Subject: Vending Machine
Initiator: snowgod
Judge: Malenkai (selected Aug 12, 1996, 08:00h New York Time) (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Bascule (selected Aug 12, 1996, 21:24h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Malenkai may not create a vending machine by invoking R115.

I have two sets of reasoning. Either one should be sufficient to require a verdict of TRUE.

#1 - R115 states that "Whatever is not explicitly prohibited or regulated by a rule is permitted and unregulated, with the sole exception of changing the rules, which is permitted only when a rule or set of rules explicitly or implicitly permits it." At first this would seem to indicate that Malenkai could indeed create a Vending Machine, per R115. However, there already exists a blueprint for an item called a vending machine, which is regulated by the rules. R593, R594 and R786 in full or in part regulate blueprints, and therefore regulate the vending machine.

However, even if the judge finds fault with that argument, please consider the following...

#2 - R703 tells us that "Nothing in Ackanomic shall have the name or title as any other thing in Ackanomic, with the exception that a Rule title may be the same as the name of an Entity that rule defines. Rules, Players, Offices, Organizations, Political Parties, and Entities defined in the rules are specifically covered by this rule, but other things may be covered as well. Proposals are specifically not covered. "

This rule does not exclude entities created by R115, so by inference we may conclude that they are covered. Since there already exists a blueprint with the a name of "Vending Machine" it seems clear the Malenkai may not create an item with the same name.

Again, the conflict of interest question. As ThinMan once pointed out, a predisposed opinion on the issue does not necessarily indicate a conflict of interest. Furthermore, if the statement can be decided by *fact*, as opposed to opinion or interpretation, conflict of interest is meaningless.

I shall thus explore the issue, and determine if it can be decided by fact. If not, I shall decide whether or not to decline.

snowgod's first argument is fallacious. R 115 allows Malenkai to create a Vending Machine. It does not allow Malenkai to create a gadget or a blueprint, as blueprints and the act of creating a gadget are protected. Malenkai did neither of these things, although the Vending Machine he instantiated has *similar* properties to a gadget described by an extant blueprint.

snowgod claims in argument one, that because the rules regulate blueprints, they regulate vending machines. He does not give us any reason to take that leap of faith, however. Thus, by implication, snowgod is claiming that blueprints are rules. Are they? I quote from R 594:

>[A Blueprint is not a legally binding document except where the Rules
> say that it is.]

A quote in notes brackets. Certainly indicates that blueprints are not rules. When R 594 passed, the text in square brackets was defined by rule to be game custom. I see no evidence that that statement is no longer game custom (i.e., blueprints have not recently become rules).

Thus the rules (as blueprints), do not regulate Vending Machines.

snowgod's second argument is fallacious. snowgod quotes R 703 in attempting to establish a claim that because an entity exists called "vending machine", Malenkai may not instantiate such, similarly named, via R 115.

This claim falls apart on 2 counts, either of which is sufficient to sink it.

First, there is no other extant entity called "vending machine". snowgod claims the "blueprint for vending machine" is called "vending machine". Game custom indicates otherwise: For example:

Blueprint for Electronic Potato/Electronic Potato
Blueprint for Scroll of Crumble/Scroll of Crumble
Blueprint for The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Much, Really/ The Really Big Blue Thing That Doesn't Do Much, Really
Blueprint for Whamiol/Whamiol

If snowgod's second argument was true, none of these gadgets could have been created either. This is pretty strong factual evidence that the blueprint for an entity is prefixed with the word "blueprint", thus avoiding the R 703 name conflict.

Secondly, even if there is a conflict, R 703 provides a remedy; it does not prevent the creation of the entity:

> 3. If two names are discovered to be identical, the procedure below is
> followed to resolve the problem:
> a. If a name chosen by a player (such as a player name, party name,
> church name, etc.) conflicts with a name previously in use, the player
> choosing the name may not use that name and must choose a new name.

It is clear that the object may still be instantiated.

If snowgod's second argument is true, then all extant gadgets must be destroyed, effective the time they were built. It is obviously false.

I do note, however, that because of Malenkai's extant vending machine, no other entity of that name may continue to exist without a name change per R 703.

I thus have shown that a verdict of FALSE is necessary. Back to the conflict of interest thing. If my argument is solid, it should not matter if I decline and let another judge have at it. If my argument has overlooked something, it would be a conflict of interest to render the verdict.

Thus I decline to judge, but ask the next judge to consider my reasoning.

Firstly, Malenkai's vending machine is not a gadget as defined by rule 786, since it does not satisfy conditions given in that rule. Thus it is not regulated by the rules in the same way as if it were a gadget built by the inventor, and therefore this judge rejects the initiator's first argument.

This judge accepts snowgod's second argument, however I differ regarding the conclusion. I concur with Malenkai that a Vending Machine is differently named to the Blueprint for a Vending Machine. Moreover, there is no gadget called a Vending Machine yet in existence. However, Rule 703 section 3a says:

> If a name chosen by a player...
> conflicts with a name previously in use, the player choosing the
> name may not use that name and must choose a new name.

The name "Vending Machine" is already in use; it appears several times in the document Blueprint: Vending Machine. Therefore, although no actual Vending Machine gadget has yet been produced, the name Vending Machine is already in use.

Therefore, the procedure in rule 703 must be used to rename Malenkai's thing.

This judge would have ruled true if this CFJ had read "Malenkai must rename his Vending Machine", or "Malenkai may not create a Vending Machine gadget by invoking R115".

Call For Judgement 264 - Mon, 19 Aug 1996 02:35:08 -0400
Subject: InterNomic Proposal Submissions
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Simon Marty Harriman (selected Aug 12, 1996, 21:57h New York Time) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: Wayne (selected Aug 15, 1996, 23:49h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

All players, including the Liaison, may make only one InterNomic Proposal per week.

From R 970:

      
> Any Ackanomic Player may request the Liaison to make an InterNomic
> Proposal by sending the Proposal to the Liaison, but may only do so
> once per week.

Certainly the Liaison is a player (either Ambassador or Speaker). I see no rule giving the Liaison the privilege of submitting more than one per week themself. InterNomic proposal submission is protected, of course.

The Liaison is a collator, similar to the Witchfinder General or the Tabulator, or the Clerk of the Courts. Those offices do not get extra votes (or whatnot) just because they are the collator and distributor of such. Why is the Liaison any different? Are we saying the Liaison would get more votes, also, when tabulating the "will of Ackanomic"?

I bring this up because the entity AckaNomic is the player in InterNomic, not the Liaison. The InterNomic world sees our proposal submissions as the work and will of AckaNomic, not as the work and will of a single player of AckaNomic, hence the once per week clause.

I have nothing against allowing a single player to submit multiple proposals to InterNomic per week. If that is the will of AckaNomic, the rules should be changed to reflect that will, however, and the priviledge should be available to all players, not just one.

I judge TRUE. R970 indicates that any player may submit only one proposal per week. This holds true for the Liaison as well. While I don't think we would require the Liaison to send the proposal to himself, the part about once per week applies to 'Any player' including the Liaison.

Call For Judgement 265 - Tue, 27 Aug 1996 08:49:15 -0400
Subject: Tabulating Votes for InterNomic Matters
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Simon Marty Harriman (selected Aug 12, 1996, 22:40h New York Time) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: Geezer (selected Aug 15, 1996, 23:53h New York Time) (failed to deliver a verdict)
3rd Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected Aug 23, 1996, 17:58h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The Assistant Tabulator is the officer responsible for tabulating votes for the purposes of how Ackanomic will vote upon any matter in Internomic.

From R 970:

> Whenever Ackanomic is permitted to vote upon any matter in Internomic,
> the Liaison shall initiate a vote in Ackanomic to determine how he
> should cast Ackanomic's vote in Internomic. The Liaison shall establish
> reasonable procedures for such voting, and shall cast Ackanomic's vote
> in accordance to the results of the vote.

The key phrases are "initiate a vote" and "establish reasonable procedures".

"Initiate a vote" can be rendered 2 ways, "reasonably". First would be to initiate the process of voting within Ackanomic, in accordance with the rules of Ackanomic, second would be to announce and conduct such vote.

Either rendering leads to the Assistant Tabulator actually conducting and reporting the vote.

I quote from R 414:

> The Duties of the Assistant Tabulator are: 

> (a) to handle solicitation, tabulation, and reporting of votes on all
> Ackanomic matters, excluding Proposals and Resolutions. This includes,
> but is not limited to: [actual list cut]

> This clause (a) and its subsections (a.x), take precedence over any
> other mutable rule which denies the Assistant Tabulator these duties,
> or would define an alternate procedure or officer (including Tabulator),
> to perform them. 

Given the first rendering, it falls to the Assistant Tabulator, as that is the officer which handles "tabulation, and reporting of votes on all Ackanomic matters, excluding Proposals and Resolutions". Determining how Ackanomic should vote in Internomic matters is not a "Proposal" or "Resolution".

The second rendering indicates that it falls to the Liaison, but R 414 explicity claims precedence: "...or would define an alternate procedure or officer". See the quote above.

Having the Assistant Tabulator tabulate and report on these votes is "a reasonable procedure". Furthermore, it is what our rules require. A verdict of TRUE is necessary.

Having considered this matter carefully I find that Malenkai's reasoning is sound and the only possible verdict is TRUE.

Go