CALL FOR JUDGEMENT ARCHIVE (191-205)

Call For Judgement 191 - Fri, 28 Jun 1996 18:20:05 -0400
Subject: Next paradox, please
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: ThinMan (selected 24-Jun-96 23:30h New York Time)
Judgement: False

Statement:

It cannot be determined with finality whether Malenkai is permitted to remain a Supreme Court Justice (or would be permitted to do so if he didn't voluntarily resign); in fact, it appears to be equally both legal and illegal to remain so.

Note that parts of this are written in past tense, thus the Judge must consider the facts as they were at the referent times, where appropriate.

Upon winning the game by paradox, R110 (relevant clause since removed), forced Malenkai to become Speaker. This is a fact that is not disputed.

At the instant that that occurred, a conflict was set up between R110 and R507. R110 insisted that Malenkai became Speaker, R507 prevented such by nature of the following clause, as Malenkai was already justice:

"[The Supreme Court] will be composed of two players (called Justices) who are neither President, Speaker, Senator or already Justice."

R507 claimed no precedence, therefore R110 held sway by virtue of its lower number, and the precedence rules.

Thus, the only way to remove the conflict, and thus have the rules remain self-consistent, was to have this event instantly remove Malenkai as a Supreme Court Justice with no time passing. One could not wait a week or two for Malenkai to resolve the situation, the rules are violating themselves for that duration, and one cannot call a CFCJ on the rules!

But instantly removing Malenkai as Justice is illegal. I quote from R 507 again:

"Once a justice, a player can never be [...] kicked of [sic] office by any other entity"

Certainly we can take "kicked of office" to mean "kicked out of office". Can we take the rules to be "any other entity"? I quote from R 660:

"Rules, the rule set, [...] are protected entities."

If they are "protected entities", they are entities.

Therefore R 507 has the paradoxical effect of declaring that it is illegal for Malenkai to be a Justice, yet makes it illegal for the rules to remove him as such. R 110 dictated that Malenkai be speaker "For the next game", thus eliminating that avenue of alleviation by precedence. Just because R 110 has been amended, its pre-existing effects have not been (qv CFJ 167).

Upon a verdict of TRUE, I claim a win by paradox. I shall also *voluntarily* resolve the situation upon such a verdict by resigning as Justice. By R110, at the time, it is not legal for me to resign as Speaker, as its past effects were not negated in its amendment.

Rule 507 most definitely makes it illegal for Malenkai to be both a Justice and Speaker at the same time. That is not in dispute. However, that does not mean that if Malenkai should choose to not resign as Justice, which may be explicitly provided for by R 507, that an illegal situation must arise.

Malenkai has argued that he may not legally resign the Speakership. I reject his argument and that position. I note the language of Rule 101, which requires that players "abide by the Rules then in effect, in the form in which they are then in effect." Players are nowhere required to abide by Rules that have been repealed, or to abide by prior forms of Rules that have since been amended. In fact, one could argue that Rule 101 implicitly allows that Players are not required to do so. In any case, in the absence of a Rule to the contrary, Rule 115 allows players to legally ignore Rules and forms of Rules that are not in effect.

I do not find CFJ 167 relevant to this issue. The reasoning supplied with that CFJ hinges on the concept that the creation of an object is a temporal action, and therefore not revoked by subsequent elimination of the entity that performed the creation. That is not analogous to Malenkai's claim that a previous form of R 110 requires that he not resign the Speakership.

As soon as R 110 was amended into its present form, Malenkai ceased to have legal grounds for remaining both Speaker and Justice. Insomuchas the Rules prohibited themselves from "kicking [him out] of office [as Justice]," they required that he cease being Speaker. In fact, one could argue that he was then _defined_ by R 507 to not be Speaker. In that case, the statement submitted for judgement is FALSE because there is no conflict in the first place.

If Malenkai continued to be Speaker after the amendment to R 110, then at that time it became legal for him to resign the Speakership. It was therefore not "equally legal and illegal" for him to remain Justice; rather, it became unquestionably legal for him to do so. However, if his decision was and is to remain a Justice, then the Rules require that he resign as Speaker. In that case, he is in violation of R507 and R101 until he resigns one office or the other. The statement submitted for judgement is again FALSE.

This judgement does not determine which is the correct interpretation of the effects of R 507 once R 110 was amended, but either option leads to the same conclusion.

Call For Judgement 192 - Mon, 24 Jun 1996 18:25 -0400
Subject: This statement is still false.
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: ThinMan (selected 25-Jun-96 01:15h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

It still cannot be determined with finality whether to apply certain parts of R545 "Notes and Comments"; the application still appears to be both legal and illegal.

By R219, I claim a win by paradox should a judgement of TRUE be returned for this CFJ.

CFJ 184 already judged this true. However, since we failed to have a Constitutional Convention, the paradox still exists.

/dev/joe's comments cannot be disputed. This situation is exactly what R 829 attempted to avoid, but R 829 was apparently flawed. I consider this CFJ to be in questionable taste, but it does an excellent job of underscoring the problem. It is my opinion that no further demonstration is necessary, and I will personally consider any other CFJ along these lines to be in very poor taste indeed.

Call For Judgement 193 - Sat, 29 Jun 1996 12:29 -0400
Subject: R 666, take four
Initiator: mr cwm
Judge: De'ghew (selected 24-Jun-96 19:30h New York Time)
(declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected 25-Jun-96 20:00h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The declaration of a "winner of the cycle" in R666/2(c) does not invoke R666/2.

Tiring of the assumption that R666/2 is recursive, I wish to Call For Judgement on the following Statement:

The declaration of a "winner of the cycle" in R666/2(c) does not invoke R666/2.

I have two arguments, either one of which I believe to be sufficient to justify a decision of TRUE. They are not mutually exclusive.

Argument 1:

R666/2(a) suspends Ackanomic play. R666/2(b) through R666/s(m) are Ackanomic procedures to be carried out beyond the bounds of Ackanomic play, much as setting up "queen on color" is part of chess but not part of chess play, or as the selection of the initial rules set was part of Ackanomic but not part of Ackanomic play. The re-invocation of R666/2 would be Ackanomic play, and, thus, is impermissible, as Ackanomic play is suspended.

Argument 2:

When R666 was adopted, "winner" had a clear meaning used unambiguously and consistently through the rules, namely, the "winner of the game." R666/2(c) defines an explicit difference between winners as defined by other rules, the declaration of which causes R666/2 to be invoked, and "winner of the cycle," which is essentially a title. (Historically, this prevents the claim that the game is over when a winner is declared, etc.) While things may have been muddied since then by other rules referring to winners of cycles, if R666/2(c) is to guide play in the form in which it was voted on (R105/0), that form must include the meanings the words had at the time, namely, that "winner" and "winner of the cycle" are two different and distinct things. R666/2(c) then, "The winner" (of the game, as defined by other rules, the declaration of which invoked R666/2 rather than ending the game) "is declared winner of the cycle" (a title, which is something else entirely, and thus does not re-invoke R666/2), is not recursive.

I accept both of mr cwm's arguments.
Reasoning follows each one.

>Argument 1:
>
>R666/2(a) suspends Ackanomic play.  R666/2(b) through R666/s(m) are
>Ackanomic procedures to be carried out beyond the bounds of Ackanomic
>play, much as setting up "queen on color" is part of chess but not part of
>chess play, or as the selection of the initial rules set was part of
>Ackanomic but not part of Ackanomic play.  The re-invocation of R666/2
>would be Ackanomic play, and, thus, is impermissible, as Ackanomic play is
>suspended.

I accept the argument as is. I also refer you to the Judgement on CFJ 189, while it is not binding, it is a Judgement I'm in complete agreement with. Hence, I must also accept this reasoning. There have been a few wins by in the last couple of weeks, but their number has not only been finite, but rather small as well.

>
>Argument 2:
>
>When R666 was adopted, "winner" had a clear meaning used unambiguously and
>consistantly through the rules, namely, the "winner of the game."
>R666/2(c) defines an explicit difference between winners as defined by
>other rules, the declaration of which causes R666/2 to be invoked, and
>"winner of the cycle," which is essentially a title.  (Historically, this
>prevents the claim that the game is over when a winner is declared, etc.)
>While things may have been muddied since then by other rules referring to
>winners of cycles, if R666/2(c) is to guide play in the form in which it
>was voted on (R105/0), that form must include the meanings the words had
>at the time, namely, that "winner" and "winner of the cycle" are two
>different and distinct things.  R666/2(c) then, "The winner" (of the game,
>as defined by other rules, the declaration of which invoked R666/2 rather
>than ending the game) "is declared winner of the cycle" (a title, which is
>something else entirely, and thus does not re-invoke R666/2), is not
>recursive.
>

I am in complete agreement with the reasoning argument as well, if I thought I could put it better ( and I usually I think I can:) I would add a lengthy paragraph of my own.

R666 has already been invoked before, when Robert Sevin won the game. If R666 had been recursive, we would be experiencing the alleged effects back then as well. Personally I thought the whole recursive argument was a big red herring to begin with, and if mr cwm hadn't called a CFJ, I might have called one myself.

Quite apart from the Judgement, I think the rule should be fixed

Call For Judgement 194 - Sat, 29 Jun 1996 12:42 -0400
Subject: Immutability of Immutable Rules
Initiator: Calvin N Hobbes
Judge: Merlin the Happy Pig (removed from the game)
2nd Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected 28-Jun-96 19:20h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The text of immutable rules can't be changed, only that of mutable rules.

I looked through the rules and could not find any rule that protected the immutables explicitly, only 491 and then indirectly. The statement has deep roots in "pure tradition": why else is there a distinction between "mutable" and "immutable"? But let me make a case.

R491 is _specific_ in what kind of rule changes there can be. It says:

>A rule change is valid if it calls for one or more of these effects,
>and no other effects: the creation of a new mutable rule; the
>amendment of an existing mutable rule; the repeal of an existing
>mutable rule; a change of the mutability of any rule.

It specifies in no uncertain terms that a change to the text of the rules is _legal_ (quote "valid") if and only if it applies to a mutable rule.

Since there are rules, such as 629,and 695 that do change the text of immutable rules,and even explicitly claim the authority to do so, then CFJ statement is obviously false. It is a weak attempt to fly in the face of reality.

Call For Judgement 195 - Sat, 29 Jun 1996 12:35 -0400
Subject: Counting rule furniture for shortness
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected 26-Jun-96 00:01h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

Proposal 866 has less than five lines of text in the body of the proposal, and thus ThinMan scored 5 points by R379 when it passed on June 13th.

The body of proposal 866 was:

A new rule shall be created with the following text:
--
If the score of any player becomes greater than the magic number, then the
magic number shall be increased by 16, or to 11 points above the highest
player score, whichever is greater.
--

I don't know if the lines containing "--" count as lines of text, and I don't care which way this goes, but I would like ThinMan's score at the end of the last cycle to be known.

While"-" is considered to be an alphanumeric character, by R570, it seems obvious to me that in this instance the function of this character is to be used a either a logical or aesthetic delimiter, or both, and therefore the lines which contain "--" and nothing else cannot be considered to be lines of text.
This rule has three lines only, and should have been given the 5 points when it passed.

Call For Judgement 196 - Tue, 02 Jul 1996 21:28 -0400
Subject: creating rules
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: De'ghew (selected 26-Jun-96 00:30h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

When proposal 906 was accepted, it did not result in the creation of a rule.

Proposal 906 was:

Restrictions on Points
Wayne (Wayne Sheppard)
Decision: Accepted

No one may have thier point total or score changed for any reason, except by methods described in the Rules.

By rule 516, "A Rule Change is a Proposal that has been adopted through the applicable process." Proposal 906 was adopted, so it became a rule change.

By rule 491, "A rule change is valid if it calls for one or more of these effects, and no other effects: the creation of a new mutable rule; the amendment of an existing mutable rule; the repeal of an existing mutable rule; a change of the mutability of any rule."

The rule change in P906 calls for none of these effects.

You've gotta be kidding.

This court disagrees with the claim that the rule change in P906 calls for none of the effects listed in R491. It is clear to the court that game custom dictates that proposals call for the creation of new rules by default. Thus this statement must be ruled false.

In support of the court's argument, please refer to the Ackanomic web. The majority of rules in the game have been created by proposals which called for the addition of rules by default. A small sampling of such rules is:

R339 Keep 'em in the Game
R379 Short is Good
R411 Office of the Web Harfer
R504 The President of Ackanomia, Creation of
R711 Appeal for Pardon

Further, /dev/joe's reasoning appears to claim that R491, in stating that "A rule change is valid if it calls for one or more of these effects. . .", invalidates rule changes which do not call for these effects. In the judgement of this court, the language of R491 does not prohibit rule changes which call for none of the effects listed.

Call For Judgement 197 - Mon, 01 Jul 1996 23:57 -0400
Subject: Manipulation
Initiator: Mohammed
Judge: this is not a name (selected 26-Jun-96 19:00h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The manipulation of an entity, for the purposes of Rule 592, is the act of changing something about it.

This has to do with the way Rule 592 is being interpreted.
I would say the word "manipulation" has enough meanings that it may be taken however the spirit of the game suggests. This statement can be judged one way or the other with no objection from me.
I wrote the rule; it was my intent that "created, destroyed, or manipulated" be taken to include anything that could have a game effect. Apparently it goes somewhat beyond that. This judgement may determine just how far.
If this is judged true, then the act of playing the Trombone, or using it to summon penguins for that matter, is legal. However, using it to conjure points is illegal (because points are protected), and turning it into a Tuba is right out.
If this is judged false, I don't think it will be sufficient to establish that playing the Ackanomic Trombone is illegal.

[no comments were made]

Call For Judgement 198 - Sat, 29 Jun 1996 11:07 -0400
Subject: Just ignore the vacationers
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: De'ghew (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Pascal (selected 28-Jun-96 20:00h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Rule 362 does not apply to vacationing players.

The argument rests on the fact that a "vacationing player" is not the same as an "active player", and the term "player", as used in R 326, has been interpreted to mean "active player" since the beginning of the game, and there is no compelling, legal, or urgent reason to suddenly change this interpretation now. There are compelling reasons as to why this interpretation should not change:

1) A player could not vacation for more than one week without being kicked out of the game. An overly harsh way to treat people who, for example, travel to Europe for 10 days.

2) Once R 362 is invoked on the vacationing player under this would be interpretation, they are out of the game, with no chance for even a reply. I quote from R 457, "Vacationing":

"The only thing a player on vacation may legally do is take himself off vacation."

Thus the player cannot respond to the Speaker's message as required by R 362. They're only option is:

3) This interpretation will promote more of the objectionable "on vacation"/ "off vacation" behaviour to avoid 1 and 2.

Vacationing players are harmless. They can be ignored, and require no maintenance. Their offices are handled. I urge the Judge to stick with the interpretation we've been using for the entire game, or show compelling reasoning why it needs to, and can be, changed.

I really don't think we can take game custom and override rules with it; R362 simply doesn't say Active Player, just Player. Even rule 457 doesn't refer to Active players and Vacationing players as separate subsets of Players, or make any claims as to the default meaning of Player. There are simply Players on Vacation, and Players not on Vacation. It seems that both groups are still Players.

Also the fact that a vacationing player cannot respond to the Speaker's message does not imply the rule can't be interpreted a certain way; the rule has a problem, but we can't overlook it.

I suggest, obviously, that noone point out the inactivity of vacationing players until the rule is fixed.

Call For Judgement 199 - Fri, 05 Jul 1996 14:44 -0400
Subject: Vacationers are Players
Initiator: pTang1001001sos
Judge: snowgod (selected Jun 27, 1996, 22:30h New York Time)
Judgement: true

Statement:

Rule 362 applies to vacationing Players.

R362:

"If any player does not vote or communicate publically with all of the Ackanomic players for a time period of one week, and this fact is pointed out to the Speaker by any player (other than the said player), then the Speaker must send a message to the player who has been absent. In this message the Speaker must ask the player if he wishes to continue playing the game, and points out why the message is being sent. If the player does not reply within two days, then the player is no longer a player in the game. The ex-player may rejoin the game later, if he desires, with the same score he had when he left."

In the past, no-one has pointed out to the Speaker the lack of public communication by vacationing players, and so I assert that there is NO current game custom to deal with this issue.

The fact that R362 deals harshly with vacationing players is a sound argument for amending the Rule, but does not give us any right to ignore its text. Particularly with the lack of ANY relevant game custom, it would be sheer fiat for anyone to conclude that R362 excludes vacationers.

To assert that a vacationing Player is not a wholly contained class within the concept of "Player" is absurd. R362 applies to them.

The court can find no fault in the above reasoning.

R457/3 states "While a player is on vacation, the player shall not not be randomly selected for anything. The player shall also not be chosen to perform any task." Answering a query from the speaker seems to qualify as a task, but since the R457 is of a higher number than "Removing Dead Players" the latter would take precedence and require a player to respond.

Though legal, this judge frowns upon players asking for vacationers to be removed from the game, since a vacationing player can do no harm.

I am therefore returning a judgement of TRUE.

Call For Judgement 200 - Tue, 9 Jul 1996 23:22 +0000
Subject: Malenkai's Speakership
Initiator: ThinMan
Judge: Dr McSpong (selected 28-Jun-96 18:45h New York Time) (left the game)
2nd Judge: Pascal (selected 02-Jul-96 21:47h New York Time) (failed to respond)
3rd Judge: snowgod (selected 06-Jul-96 13:42h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE at Sat, 06 Jul 1996 23:57 -0400
Appealed by: ThinMan
Appeal Judgement: True

Statement:

Malenkai ceased to be Speaker when R 110 was amended into its current form.

Until the most recent amendment of R110, Malenkai was both Speaker and Justice. R110 established that he was Speaker, and R507 prevented him from being removed as Justice. When R110 was amended, however, the clause establishing Malenkai's continued Speakership was removed. Rule 507 states that "[Justices] are neither President, Speaker, Senator, or already Justice." By definition, then, Malenkai, who was and is a Justice, was not Speaker any longer.

[Although this case looks pretty sturdy to me, I don't really care what the judgement is. I just want an interpretation recorded. Also, I have no objection to Malenkai's Speakership -- I think he does a fine job. I do, however, insist that the Rules be obeyed.]

Though the issue is now moot, I am returning a judgement of FALSE. Though rule 507 states that "[Justices] are neither President, Speaker, Senator, or already Justice.". It is the belief of the court that this rule could force a resignation (an action by a player), but it claims no power to immediately remove a player from office (an action by a rule).

I am not convinced that snowgod's judgement is actually incorrect, but his reasoning is wholly unsatisfactory. My primary objection is that Rules have whatever power they legally assign themselves, explicitly or implicitly. The rule need not explicitly "claim" any power to generate any otherwise legal effect; the Rule grants itself whatever power is necessary.

Also, though this may be an issue of semantics, I claim that R 507 did not perform any "action" removing Malenkai from the office of Speaker -- rather, it _defined_ that he was not Speaker.

If I pass a rule that says "Malenkai is not Speaker," and assign it sufficient precedence, then I claim that Malenkai will cease to be Speaker, and will not become Speaker again until and unless that Rule is amended or repealed. Such a Rule does not force Malenkai to resign, for it declares that Malenkai does not hold the office in the first place.

Indeed, this is exactly the opposite side of the coin from the former wording of R110 that made Malenkai Speaker when he last won, and _by it's wording_ declared that he continue to be Speaker for the remainder of the ensuing cycle. It did not declare it illegal for Malenkai to resign. In fact, I argue that Malenkai could legally have resigned -- it just wouldn't have gotten him out of office.

The Supreme Court concurs with ThinMan.

>From R507:
>[The Supreme Court] will be composed of two players (called
>Justices) who are neither President, Speaker, Senator or already
>Justice.

This passage defines a Justice as being not-Speaker. For a time, there existed a paradox where Malenkai was made Speaker, but no mechanism for immediately removing him from either this office or from the Supreme Court existed.

>From the old 110:
>The winner of the last game shall become the new Speaker for the
>next game, assuming all current duties allocated to the Speaker.

>From 507:
>Once a justice, a player can never be voted out or kicked of office
>by any other entity, except by a petition of at least two thirds the
>number of players.

With the amendment of R110, Malenkai ceased to be Speaker.

Verdict: True

Penalty for Snowgod: 1 point.

Call For Judgement 201 - Thu, 18 Jul 1996 22:16 -0400
Subject: R666 Paradox win, AGAIN
Initiator: pTang1001001sos
Judge: Mohammed (selected Jun 28, 1996, 19:00h New York Time) (declined to judge -- deemed it invalid by R589)
CFJ 215 determined that another judge must be selected.
2nd Judge: Wayne (selected Jul 14, 1996, 01:52h New York Time) (failed to respond)
3rd Judge: De'ghew (Wed, 17 Jul 1996 12:03:51 -0400)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The legality of the following action: "/dev/joe creates Right-Handed Grapefruit Juice" cannot be determined with finality. I thereby claim a paradox win under R219.

When /dev/joe was declared a winner, R666 "kicked in". Upon application of clause (c), R666 starts over again. In effect, the process described in R666 is being continuously launched ad infinitum.

I argue that it is impossible to determine, at any given moment, whether /dev/joe is in possession of a Right Handed Grapefruit(RHG), since he is being awarded RHGs and they are also being "eliminated" each time the R666 process is carried out.

Note that a new R666 process is being launched every time clause (c) of the previous R666 process is executed, so it is impossible to say when the newest RHG is being awarded relative to the last "elimination" of all RHGs.

It's a total mess. I defy anyone to determine whether /dev/joe has a RHG that he can squeeze.

I decline to judge this on the grounds that it is not a single statement. I'm not sure where it goes from here. Presumably it dies. (?) --End quote

Mohammed has declined judgement. In so doing, he has also invoked R 589 (implicitly) to claim it is not a single statement. The question is does "declining" fall under the auspices of the rule which allows the judge-designates to decline, or do we throw it out. I note that this is different than CFJ 205, which was judged UNDECIDED.

The CotC, the initiator, and the judge-designate have all stated that it is invalid by R 589, therefore it dies, unless someone presents a counterargument that should not.

R589, "Invoking Judgement" says: "Any CFJ must include a single, clear, and clearly labeled statement. . ." This CFJ includes two statements for judgement and is therefore invalid by R589.
In the absence of rules dictating how invalid CFJ's should be ruled, this court returns the judgment of false as suggested by game custom, established in CFJ215.

Call For Judgement 202 - Sat, 29 Jun 1996 12:39 -0400
Subject: R666 Paradox win, AGAIN
Initiator: pTang1001001sos
Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected Jun 28, 1996, 21:15h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

I win by paradox because I now point out that the legality of the following action: "/dev/joe creates Right-Handed Grapefruit Juice" cannot be determined with finality.

When /dev/joe was declared a winner, R666 "kicked in". Upon application of clause (c), R666 starts over again. In effect, the process described in R666 is being continuously launched ad infinitum.

I argue that it is impossible to determine, at any given moment, whether /dev/joe is in possession of a Right Handed Grapefruit(RHG), since he is being awarded RHGs and they are also being "eliminated" each time the R666 process is carried out.

Note that a new R666 process is being launched every time clause (c) of the previous R666 process is executed, so it is impossible to say when the newest RHG is being awarded relative to the last "elimination" of all RHGs.

It's a total mess. I defy anyone to determine whether /dev/joe has a RHG that he can squeeze.

R666 is not infinitely recursive. The reasoning is the same as CFJ193. Note that I am not relying on CFJ 193, I am simply pointing out that the reasoning of CFJ193 can be quoted in its entirety to explain why R666 is not recursive.
Since the argument of recursiveness is false, so is the conclusion concerning the ownership of the Right Handed Grapefruit, and following that, /dev/joe, can create as much Right Handed Grapefruit Juice as he likes, as long as no one else wins the game.

Might I suggest that amend the number of that rule?

Call For Judgement 203 - Tue, 02 Jul 1996 21:35 -0400
Subject: R666 Paradox win, AGAIN
Initiator: pTang1001001sos
Judge: ThinMan (selected Jun 28, 1996, 21:25h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The legality of the following action: "/dev/joe creates Right-Handed Grapefruit Juice" cannot be determined with finality.

When /dev/joe was declared a winner, R666 "kicked in". Upon application of clause (c), R666 starts over again. In effect, the process described in R666 is being continuously launched ad infinitum.

I argue that it is impossible to determine, at any given moment, whether /dev/joe is in possession of a Right Handed Grapefruit(RHG), since he is being awarded RHGs and they are also being "eliminated" each time the R666 process is carried out.

Note that a new R666 process is being launched every time clause (c) of the previous R666 process is executed, so it is impossible to say when the newest RHG is being awarded relative to the last "elimination" of all RHGs.

It's a total mess. I defy anyone to determine whether /dev/joe has a RHG that he can squeeze.

It is now game custom that R 666 is not recursive.

Call For Judgement 204 - Mon, 01 Jul 1996 19:59 -0400
Subject: Just curious
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: mr cwm (selected Jun 28, 1996, 21:55h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

Immutable rules may defer precedence to Mutable rules, either explicitly or implicitly.

I've heard both sides of this argument, actually. I'm interested in the Judge's opinion. I at least refer the Judge to R 108 and R 210.

I note that R210 does not apply to an apparent conflict between an immutable and a mutable rule. I also note that the conflicts referred to in R210 are only apparent, as R210 provides a method for resolving apparent conflicts, so the perceived conflict no longer exists. A real conflict, that is, one that is unresolvable, would probably cause a Paradox Win.

If an immutable rule were to attempt or appear to defer to a mutable rule, the mutable rule would not be inconsistent with the immutable rule (as would be required to invoke R108). Rather, following the immutable rule (which may or may not have precedence, as we have no way of determining precedence for mutable and immutable rules that are not in conflict, but since there is no conflict, the lack of a method for determining precedence is irrelevant) would require that we look to mutable rule for guidance in all matters beyond the deferment. If, on the other hand, we follow the mutable rule, we arrive at the same result. The deferment will not have caused a conflict or inconsistency, and thus the deferment is not only permitted, but has its stated effect (which wasn't the subject of the CFJ, but a ruling of "it is permitted but has no effect" would be unsatisfactorily narrow).

Call For Judgement 205 - Mon, 01 Jul 1996 20:05 -0400
Subject: Immutable Rules
Initiator: Calvin N Hobbes
Judge: mr cwm (selected Jun 29, 1996, 21:15h New York Time)
Judgement: UNDECIDED

Statement:

The text of immutable rules cannot be changed by a proposal. The only way to alter them is via power granted by rules that specifically and directly allow entities to do so.

[no additional material was provided by the initiator - CotC]

According to R589 a CFJ with multiple statements shall not be considered for judgement. Although a having two sentences does not necessarily mean that a paragraph contains two statements (nor, I suppose, does having only one sentence necessarily mean that a paragraph contains only one statement), the paragraph labelled as a statement in this CFJ does contain two statements. How can I follow the directives of R589 in this case? If I were to interpret R589 as requiring me to refuse judgement, the problem would simply fall to someone else. Hence, I have accepted judgement then found that, according to R589, I can not consider this CFJ. A CFJ that can not be considered must remain UNDECIDED.

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