CALL FOR JUDGEMENT ARCHIVE (491-505)

Call For Judgement 491 - Sun 14 Dec 1997 22:20
Subject: Founding Chrurches
Initiator: rufus
Judge: mr cwm (selected 97-12-14 23:20)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

There is no such church AHH#1.

some people seem to think that churches can't be founded. Enquiring minds want to know

The requirements for a Church to come into existance are listed in R1301/18: "A Church officially exists when the player has three Followers in addition to eirself and publically announces all of the following details of the Church: ... ."

The public announcement requirement was met by else...if's message of December 14.

The question, then, is whether the "three Followers" requirement has been met. I note that these three are followers of the player intending to found the Church, not followers of the Church, so the Church need not be in existance prior to its founding. "Followers" is not defined by the Rules, but, fortunately, there is a long-standing Game Custom that Followers are those players who have agreed to be listed as members in the public announcement founding the Church.

All the requirements of R1301/18 were met. Church AHH#1 exists.

Call For Judgement 492 - Mon 15 Dec 1997 10:52
Subject: Overriding
Initiator: Slakko
Judge: mr cwm (selected 97-12-16 20:43)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The last sentence of Rule 216 is overridden by Rule 101.

Rule 101 states that:
Game custom, spirit of the game, and linguistic interpretation are external concepts and are not regulated or part of the game state.

Rule 216 is:
If a statement on which Judgement has been called is Judged to be true, and that Judgement is not overruled, it does not thereby become a rule, or any part of a rule. It merely becomes an explicit part of currently accepted game custom.

The last sentence of Rule 216 attempts to regulate currently accepted game custom, a subset of game custom. This is contradictory to Rule 101, which states that game custom is not regulated.

These two rules specify no means of conflict resolution, and so, according to "Resolving Conflict", 101 takes precedence over 216. Hence the last sentence of Rule 216 is overridden by Rule 101, and hence this statement should be judged TRUE.

I find the Initiator's reasoning to be sound. I wish to point out, however, that this does not mean that statements Judged TRUE are not an explicit part of accepted game custom, only that they do not become so by R216.

Call For Judgement 493 - Tue 16 Dec 1997 12:06
Subject: Those Silly Agenda Hats
Initiator: Vynd
Judge: The Gingham Wearer (selected 97-12-16 20:47)
Judgement: FALSE (without comment)

Statement:

It is permissible for a player to send to the Illuminatus a number of Agenda conditions fewer than 3 minus the number of Agenda Hats that player owns.

This is actually kind of important, because Crackfoo has done exactly what I have described in my statement. Rule 431, which governs the submission of Agenda conditions, has this to say:

"During this [ed. the Agenda Condition submission period] time, any player may submit a number of Agenda Conditions equal to three minus the number of Agenda Hats e owns by sending them to them to the Illuminatus. If a player sends more than this number of Agenda Conditions, only the first Agenda Conditions sent will be counted."

The key here is that it requires the number of conditions sent to be "equal" to 3 minus the number of Agenda hats the player has. The rule does go on to override this by saying that more than this number can be sent, but it never says that it is permissible to send fewer. I think that this means that it is not in fact permissible, but I'm not sure.

Call For Judgement 494 - Tue 16 Dec 1997 22:07
Subject: Multiple Judges
Initiator: else..if
Judge: two-star (selected 97-12-17 19:19) (deadbeat)
2nd Judge: Malenkai (assigned 97-12-21 21:16)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

A new judge must be chosen for CFJ 484.

The portion of rule 212 in question says: "The player selected has 3 days in which to accept or refuse the appointment by posting to the applicable officer....If a selected player actively declines appointment, then a further random selection is made from the remaining pool." Clearly, Balsamic Dragon accepted judgement for CFJ 484, and according to rule 213, must deliver a judgement. However, in addition, Balsamic Dragon has declined judgement. Therefore a new judge must be chosen. In particular, it is worth noting that the conjunction "or" in English is ambiguous, and can mean "A or B," or "A or B, but not both" In its strict logical context however, it is taken to mean the latter. Since there is no indication other than game custom that both refusing and accepting is impossible, and using the strictest definition of the word "or" it is indeed possible, Balsamic Dragon has both accepted and refused CFJ 484, and a new judge must be selected.

As the initiator has pointed out, the word "or" in rule 213 appears ambiguous. The first definition of "or" in my dictionary is: "used as a function word to indicate an alternative ...". In other words, one alternative but not both. (This is confirmed by a check of the definition of 'alternative': "a proposition or situation offering a choice between two or more things only one of which may be chosen"). [interesting, but irrelevant, to note that 'or' is defined using 'alternative', and 'alternative' is defined using 'or' :-)].

The fourth definition in that same dictionary goes on to define "or" in the logical sense, meaning one alternative, or perhaps both, which is the definition that would allow a judge to both accept and decline a CFJ, as the initiator seems to be arguing for.

It is my judgement that the first definition given in this case is the traditional English meaning of the word "or", and that "or" is rarely construed as in the fourth definition, except under certain specific circumstances, where the context makes it clear that this is the intended construction.

Game custom has preferred traditional English construction unless the construct in question has been overloaded by the rules or prior disambiguating customary interpretation. I see no reason why the logical construction should be favored over the traditional one in this case. Moreover, a search of the rules for "or" backs up using the traditional as opposed to the logical meaning.

Thus accepting and refusing (declining) are alternatives, and once Balsamic Dragon accepted CFJ 484, an alternative had been chosen, hence refusing was no longer possible, thus eir attempt to do so failed, hence my verdict of FALSE.

I must point out that at the time this CFJ was filed, Balsamic Dragon had not yet deadbeated, so there was no other reason at that time to choose a new judge either.

Call For Judgement 495 - Wed 17 Dec 1997 16:59
Subject: This CFJ is Invalid
Initiator: else..if (without reasoning)
Judge: K 2 (selected 97-12-17 19:23)
Judgement: FALSE
Appealed by else...if
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

This CFJ is FALSE.

Now why did I get a sense of deja vu when I read this CFJ? Oh yes, CFJ 294.

Rule 213 states:
"Having accepted the appointment a Judge has exactly one week in which to post an official Judgement."

This statement empowers the appointed judge (and only the appointed judge) to pass Judgement on the assigned CFJ. Nothing else, is entitled to do so. Judgement on a CFJ is the sole preserve of the appointed judge. The purpose of a CFJ's statement is to be considered by the judge and to have judgement passed on it, not to pass judgement on the CFJ itself and the rules do not empower it to do so.
The statement of this CFJ attempts to pass judgement on this CFJ, an action that it is not entitled to perform, and thus is in conflict with the rules. As such I proclaim it false.

To finish off I will paraphrase CFJ 294:

"Despite the pseudo-Godelian statement, the Judge is more than able to deliver TRUE as the verdict of this CFJ. No rules require that CFJ's make logical sense or avoid creating cognitive paradoxi. In fact, I briefly considered delivering a verdict of TRUE without comment just to prove this point. The Judge's ability to deliver a TRUE verdict is in no way abridged, and so I judge this statement to be FALSE.

I CAN deliver a verdict of TRUE on this statement. I have chosen not to. " [Guy Fawkes, CFJ 294, 19/9/96]

I disagree. This differs from CFJ 294 in a fundemental way. The verdict on 294 depended on the face that the statement illegally forbade the judge from judging true. This statement does not prevent you from making a decision, it makes a statement about the game state, and requests a judgement of either TRUE or FALSE.

The statement does not "pass judgement." A statement, by definition, has no binding effect. It is a fact about the game state. This statement postulates that the CFJ it is contained in is false. It remains up to the judge to determine the truth of the CFJ and the contained statement.

I disagree. If the judge delivers a verdict of TRUE then e is stating that the statement contained is TRUE, and therefore the CFJ is FALSE.

This is a paradox. If the CFJ is FALSE, then its statement must be FALSE. Therefore the CFJ must not be FALSE.

Where CFJ statements are imprecise or otherwise open to interpretation, as is the one in question here, the first task before the Court is to determine the correct interpretation of the CFJ statement. There are three alternatives in this case:

(1) The statement claims that the CFJ's verdict is FALSE.
(2) The statement claims that it itself is false.
(3) The statement claims that the CFJ is false in some other way, i.e. not a CFJ, not legally filed, or such.

The Court rejects alternative (3) as unlikely, with the observation that such an interpretation would inficate a verdict of FALSE in our opinion. Moreover, the Court sees no circumstance indicating a verdict of TRUE under this alternative in which the CFJ would be binding in any way, or, indeed, exist at all.

The Court observes that alternative (2) would obligate us to return a verdict of INVALID in accordance with Rule 211.

It is the Court's opinion that alternative (1) leads to a verdict of FALSE. As K2 observed, the truth or falsehood of a CFJ statement is evaluated with respect to the time the CFJ was submitted. At the time this CFJ was submitted it had not been judged yet, and it particularly had not been judged FALSE. The CFJ statement is therefore FALSE.

It is the opinion of the Court that alternative (1) is to be preferred. The verdict of a CFJ seems a more representative measure of the truth value of "this CFJ" as a whole than does the truth value of the CFJ statement, where there is any difference. If the submitter had wanted the statement to be interpreted according to alternative (2), then he could just as easilly have submitted it as "This statement is false."

The Court remarks that no alternative interpretation leaves us unable to render a verdict. This CFJ was thus never destined to do as else...if hoped.

Appeal Penalty: 10 points for frivolously bothering the Justices.

Call For Judgement 496 - Wed 17 Dec 1997 19:33
Subject: Judging CFJ 495
Initiator: else..if
Judge: two-star (selected 97-12-17 19:49)
Judgement: retracted

Statement:

CFJ 495 cannot be judged, and causes a paradox.

If CFJ is judged TRUE, than it is FALSE, and therefore must not be judged FALSE, and must be judged TRUE. This is clearly a paradox. A judgement of UNDECIDED does not help the issue because it only moves the case to the Supreme Court. It was filed legally and is entirely legitimate, and so cannot be judged INVALID.

Call For Judgement 497 - Wed 17 Dec 1997 22:20
Subject: Judging CFJ 495
Initiator: else..if
Judge: Alfvaen (selected 97-12-20 15:19)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

It is impossible to judge CFJ 495, thus making further play on this impossible.

If CFJ is judged TRUE, than it is FALSE, and therefore must not be judged FALSE, and must be judged TRUE. This is clearly a paradox. A judgement of UNDECIDED does not help the issue because it only moves the case to the Supreme Court. CFJ 495 is not "inherently contradictory." Rule 211 says that CFJs with inherently contradictory statements are invalid. However all 495's statement says is that the CFJ is false. This statement does not conflict with itself. Even if it is argued that the CFJ as a whole is self-contradictory, that does not make the *statement* self-contradictory, as is required for it to be INVALID. If this is judged TRUE, I claim a paradox win as specified in rule 601.

Here is the Statement of CFJ 495:

This CFJ is false.

Rule 215 states, "All Judgements must be in accordance with all the rules in effect at the time judgement was invoked, and with respect to the game state at that time."

At the time CFJ 495 was submitted, the CFJ was neither TRUE nor FALSE. (I'm not quite sure whether one can refer to the CFJ _itself_ as being TRUE or FALSE, as opposed to being _judged_ TRUE or FALSE, but for the moment I'll accept it. else...if could just resubmit CFJ 495 with the appropriate phrasing anyway. :-)

So, therefore, one can only judge CFJ 495 as FALSE, because it states that CFJ 495 has a truth value _at the time it was submitted_, which it does not. Even if ruling CFJ 495 to be FALSE makes the statement TRUE just after the judgement is delivered, it does not change the fact that the statement was not TRUE when CFJ 495 was submitted.

Thus, it _is_ possible to judge CFJ 495, and this CFJ's statement is FALSE.

Call For Judgement 498 - Thu 18 Dec 1997 17:46
Subject: Synod action
Initiator: Slakko
Judge: K 2 (selected 97-12-20 15:21)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

A Synod action cannot occur unless it has first been suggested on a public mailing list.

Rule 1303, "Synod", does not describe a method by which the Synod takes any action. However, it does state that the Synod is an Organization. Therefore, Rule 1005, "Organizational Actions", dictates how the Synod shall perform actions. This rule specifies that any action for an organization must first be suggested by one of its members as a public message.

Any message not on a public mailing list is not a public message, and hence without a message on a public mailing list suggesting an action for the Synod to take, the Synod cannot take that action.

**********
Rule 1303 states in section 6:

"
6. All actions carried out by the Synod must be approved by the Delegates. Each Delegate's vote is multiplied by the number of non-vacationing members of eir Church. When there more votes in favor of some action than against it the Synod is considered to support that action. Churches whose Seats are unoccupied during the vote are said to have abstained from the Vote.
"

Thus, according to Rule 1303, a Synod action involves :

1. a vote on the action by the Synod's Delegates.
2. If there are more votes in favour the Synod supports the action.
3. The Yor-Delegate then acts on behalf of the Synod, in accordance with the decisions of the Synod. (section 5b)

Rule 1303 does not, however, define a method by which 'some action' comes under consideration by the Synod.

As a Unique Organization, however, the Synod is also governed by Rule 1005, which states in the second paragraph detailing organizational actions, :

"
First, some member of the Organization sends a public message suggesting an action for the Organization to take.
"

In addition, Rule 373 States:

"
If the rules specify that a certain course of play is available to a player or organization, but do not specify how that course of play is to be taken, then that course of play is a public action, and it is taken as described above.
"

In order for the Synod to support, and subsequently carry out an action, it must first be proposed. Since Rule 1303 is silent on the matter, Rule 1005 has effect. Thus, a Synod action must first be suggested publicly. (ie on a public mailing list)

****************
TRUE

Call For Judgement 499 - Thu 18 Dec 1997 18:58
Subject: Chrome streaks
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: two-star (selected 97-12-20 15:23) (deadbeat)
2nd Judge: Malenkai (assigned 97-12-31 23:58) (declined)
3rd Judge: Supreme Court (assigned 98-01-03 12:33)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Malenkai received 15 points for the Chrome Streak which included Proposal 2388.

As originally harfed, the Chrome Streak stretched from 2379 to 2390. Malenkai had three Proposals in the Streak: 2380, 2381, and 2390, and thus received 15 bonus points upon the announcement of the Streak.

Slakko's allegation is that since Proposal 2389 was Null, that Malenkai could not have received bonus points from Proposal 2390. His argument goes something like this(apologies for any misconstrual):

Rule 207, Section VII, states:

VII. Null Proposals

The above provisions notwithstanding, if an accepted proposal does not become a new rule or generate at least one valid effect under Rule 103, no points are scored by any player as a result of that proposal being accepted, the preceding provisions of this rule notwithstanding. Such proposals, and only such proposals, are "Null Proposals".

Proposal 2390 is only in the Chrome Streak as a result of Proposal 2389 being accepted. Therefore, Malenkai should not get any bonus points from Proposal 2390's presence in the Streak.

I hold that this reasoning is absurd, and could be carried to ridiculous lengths if _any_ points from _any_ result of a Null Proposal being accepted were nullified. Of course, absurdity is not necessary a compelling counterargument...

Rule 207 concerns itself almost entirely with score changes that occur as a direct result of a proposal's voting results being reported. After four sections that describe such score changes, section VII states that, in the case of a Null Proposal, "no points are scored by any player as a result of that proposal being accepted, the preceding provisions of this rule notwithstanding".

The Court agrees that a natural interpretation of this sentence would be that it refers only to the score changes that are outlined in the "preceding provisions". This would indicate a verdict of True.

An alternate interpretation would have to be that this sentence prevents all score changes from occuring that any rule describes as resulting from "that proposal being accepted". This would indicate a verdict of False.

The alternate interpretation is certainly more difficult to adhere to; however, both interpretations are perfectly valid readings of the sentence, taken on their own. Therefore the Court must look, first to game custom, and then to the spirit of the game, to determine which is actually more appropriate.

The only prior instance of a Null Proposal is Proposal 1641, authored by Niccolo Flychuck. If we examine the game state, it will be seen that Niccolo Flychuck happened to possess the Great Tuba at that time. And, despite this fact, Niccolo Flychuck was awarded no points from the acceptance of Proposal 1641.

The Court agrees with the initiator that this is not the preferable interpretation, and that spirit of the game would likely deny it on the grounds that it could put an excessive burden on the Scorekeeper. However, game custom cannot be flouted without due process, and so the Court must return a verdict of False.

Call For Judgement 500 - Thu 18 Dec 1997 20:28
Subject: Taxing question
Initiator: Alfvaen
Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected 97-12-20 15:26) (declined)
2nd Judge: Vynd (selected 97-12-21 20:57)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The A$10 Balsamic Dragon received at the end of the game of viruses e was refereeing was not taxed at the end of Cycle 16.

Cycle 16 ended when Malenkai "gained 1 win" from Beldin's Pants. So did the abovementioned game of Viruses, for which Balsamic Dragon received A$10, when Alfvaen gained 1 win at the same time.

Now, did this award of A$10 occur _before_ Rule 666 kicked in, suspended play, and taxed Balsamic Dragon(among others)20% of eir Total Wealth? No, it occurred at the same time. So was it taxed? What Cycle did Balsamic Dragon receive that money in, or in none at all? Is it possible for events to occur simultaneously with End of Cycle?

Judge's Comments: Rule 666 states that upon a Cycle winning condition being achieved, Ackanomic play is suspended. I am not sure if the award for Virus' referee was given at the same time that the game was won, or immediately afterwards. In the later case, it would have occured after the Cycle had ended and not been taxed. In the first case, it would try to happen at the same time that the cycle ended, but fail because Rule 666 has precedence, and (I think) occur immediately after play resumed. It definitely wasn't taxed though. So I judge this CFJ to be TRUE.

Call For Judgement 501 - Sun 21 Dec 1997 16:22
Subject: Super-Collosal Cycle Win Attempt
Initiator: two-star
Judge: Vynd (selected 97-12-21 21:00)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

two-star owns the Malenkai and Alfvaen's Super-Collosal Cycle Win Attempt.

"A player-created Trinket, whose name contains the name of a current or former player other than that of the creating player, such that the player name in question existed before the Trinket was created, is a forgery. The rules may define other circumstances under which a Trinket is a forgery. Upon it becoming publically knowable that a Trinket is a forgery, it is transferred to the Treasury, unless the player name contained in its name is that of a currently active player, in which case it is transferred to that player."

The supreme court's CFJ 474 reasoning causes me to believe that this cfj should be judged false and the OiCoRT should choose one of the set of players whose names are in the name of the trinket in question to receive the forgery.

I am ruling this CFJ FALSE. I see three possibilities as to what happened to the Super-Collosal trinket, and none of them leave it in two-star's posession. It is my opinion that the trinket was transfered to the Treasury upon it becoming publicly knowable that it was a forgery, because it contained the name of more than one player. Rule 506 specifies this as the default occurance, and the only exception seems to deal with cases where one player's name is included. I realize this is a somewhat forced reading, but it makes the most sense to me. The other possibilities are that it was transfered to one of the players in its name, or that it was transfered to one of them, then immediately to the other one, and is in some sort of endless loop. And you thought my first possibility was farfetched...

Call For Judgement 502 - Sun 21 Dec 1997 18:14
Subject: Auction them Unnamed Entities
Initiator: Vynd
Judge: /dev/joe (selected 97-12-21 21:04)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

It is impossible to successfuly call an Auction Them Entities hearing without specifying the name of the entity to be auctioned.

Rule 520 states that "When a player calles an Auction them Entities hearing e must specify the name of a Tradeable Ownable Entity which is in the Treasury."

Rule 520 explicitly states that the player calling the Auction Them Entities hearing must specify the name of an entity, and later states that the entity named is the one that gets auctioned (given the appropriate verdict in the hearing). If the rule merely stated that the player calling the hearing had to specify an entity, then other methods of specifying the entity besides specifying its name would be allowed.

Nowhere in the rules is there any other way described for a player to call an Auction Them Entities hearing.

Call For Judgement 503 - Sun 28 Dec 1997 10:01
Subject: Does this apply to multiplication by zero also?
Initiator: The Gingham Wearer
Judge: Alfvaen (selected 97-12-28 20:30)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Changing the rules is impossible.

Rule 340 states:
"Whenever division is performed in Ackanomic, and the denomonator of that division evaluates to 0, then the result of that entire division shall be 0."

By defining a number divided by 0 then all numbers are equal.

For example:
if a/x=y
and b/x=y
then a=b

1/0=0
2/0=0
therefore 1=2

Likewise all numbers are equal to all other numbers. No new rule can be created since it is impossible to give the rule a unique number. No rule can be modified or repealed since it is impossible to unambiguously state which rule is to be modified or repealed.

Let me try to analyze his algebraic reasoning up there.

(a/x = y) and (b/x = y) implies (a=b)

How is this derived, then?

a. a/x=y (given)
b. b/x=y (given)
c. ax/x=xy (multiplying both sides by x)
d. bx/x=xy (multiplying both sides by x)
e. a=xy (cancelling same quantity on top and bottom of denominator)
f. b=xy (cancelling same quantity on top and bottom of denominator)
g. a=b (quantities equal to the same thing are equal to each other)

I think the crucial points are the assumptions that multiplying both sides of an equality by the same quantity x maintains the equality, and that you can necessarily cancel every quantity that is on both the top and the bottom of the denominator. But, if we are in Rule-340 land where x/0=0 for any x, in general nonzero, then:

h. a/0 = 0 (From Rule 340)
i. (a/0)*0 = 0 (multiplying both sides by zero)
j. a = 0 (cancelling same quantity on top and bottom of denominator)

We would call the above conclusion absurd, since a is not, in general, equal to zero.

So we have several choices to reconcile this.

1. We can redefine equality so that every number is equal to itself, and to zero. This is what The Gingham Wearer has done. I'm sure most of us remember that hoary old algebraic "proof" that 1=2, which involves division by zero at a crucial point.

2. We can say that multiplying both sides of an equality by zero does _not_ result in an equality. This is perfectly possible, but I don't think it is strictly necessary.

3. We can say that zero cannot be cancelled if it is on the numerator and the denominator of a fraction. This one seems to me the most promising.

For instance, let us take (a/0)*0. If we presume that we can multiple the factor through, we have (a*0)/0, or 0/0. By Rule 340, this is still equal to zero. Spurious "cancelling" of the zero would result in a, which is still equal to zero. If we assume the cancelling cannot occur, we end up with 0 = 0 instead of a = 0. This breaks down the reasoning in steps e. and f. above, since ax/x does not equal a _iff x=0_. So, (a/x = y) and (b/x = y) implies (a=b) iff x!=0 is the more proper reasoning in this case, and so (a/0 = 0) and (b/0 = 0) does not imply a=b. We are thus able to numerically distinguish rule numbers in this case.

So which of the three cases(well, two, since we'll neglect 2. for the moment)is true? The Rules are silent on this matter, so let me consider currently existing game custom and the spirit of the game. The former indicates that we can distinguish rule numbers; when Proposal 2433 went through, we did not all decide that all rule numbers were indistinguishable right away. Also, I believe that it is in the spirit of the game for rule numbers to be distinguishable, if we are forced to have division by zero defined as zero in Ackanomic algebra.

And besides, be fair, _when_ are you ever going to divide a rule number by zero? It's not going to come up that often, so it shouldn't throw the entire game out of whack.

So I must consider case 3. to be true, and judge FALSE.

Call For Judgement 504 - Tue 30 Dec 1997 01:16
Subject: I Think I May Have Screwed Up
Initiator: breadbox
Judge: No other players (aka The Gingham Wearer) (selected 97-12-30 08:59)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

A vacationing player who has not voted on a proposal may still cast a vote on said proposal if they have a Proxy.

A player who is on vacation is still permitted to vote, in a sense. That is to say, they may not send votes to the Tabulator, but any votes submitted prior to the vacation are still counted. Exactly how this works is not entirely clear, admittedly. Rule 255 says that a vacationing player is not an active player, but then later says that any votes cast before going on vacation are still counted. Since the later sentence takes precedence, I have usually interpreted this to mean that they are considered active for the purposes of Tabulating that particular proposal.

Rule 106 defines how Proxies work. The upshot of it is that it is essentially impossible for a player with a Proxy to not cast a vote (ignoring for the moment the issue of players being on vacation). Note that the process of casting a proxied vote only applies to "Voting Players". Also note that the language of Rule 106 is such that it is the player's vote which is being cast. Finally, note that the time that these proxied votes are cast is "the instant before the end of the voting period".

So, is this proxied casting of a vote considered to be a vote cast with respect to Rule 255? Originally I though it was, but now I'm beginning to think I may have been wrong.

As a final complication, Rule 255 takes precedence over Rule 106.

If I am wrong, and this CFJ is ruled False, then a vacationing player cannot cast votes via Proxy. This means that the voting results released for proposals 2538 through 2544 are incorrect, as Slakko has authorized Balsamic Dragon to be his proxy, and I counted him as voting on all of these proposals. Not only will this affect his score, but the change will cause proposal 2540 to have been accepted.

Rule 255 states:

"The only thing a player on vacation may legally do is take himself off vacation and send public messages."

Rule 106 states:

"At the instant before the end of the voting period of a proposal, all Voting Players that have not cast a vote on the proposal, and have a Proxy, will cast a vote identical to the vote cast by their Proxy (if their Proxy cast a vote) on the proposal"

Note that the player eirself casts the vote, not that the vote is cast for em. This is something that vacationing players are not allowed to do. Therefore an attempt to cast votes by any vacationing player fails. Any doubt is removed by the section in rule 255 stating:

"This rule has precedence over any rule which conflicts in whole or in part, with any of its provisions."

Therefore I judge false.

Call For Judgement 505 - Tue 30 Dec 1997 09:36
Subject: Name games
Initiator: No other players (aka The Gingham Wearer)
Judge: Malenkai (selected 97-12-31 23:32)
Judgement: FALSE
Appealed by The Gingham Wearer (aka No other players)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The name of the player using the e-mail address t.walmsley@lineone.net is "The Gingham Wearer".

There are two possibilities here, he is either called "The Gingham Wearer" or he is called "No other players". Therefore, to judge this CFJ it is necessary to ascertain whether his attempted name change took place. Rule 1 states:

"The game state may not be altered in such a way as to cause the customary interpretation of this rule to be changed."

It also states:

"Those players who were members of Vulcan on August 28, 1997 [/dev/joe, Malenkai, ThinMan, and Vynd] are Evil Overlords of Ackanomic (retired). No other players and no non-players are Evil Overlords of Ackanomic (retired)."

I believe that had the attempted name change to "No other players" occurred then it would have altered the game state so as to change the customary interpretation of rule 1, i.e. if the first quote from rule 1 did not exist then the name change would have succeeded and "No other players" would have become an Evil Overlord of Ackanomic (retired).

I would also like to point out that this is significantly different to CFJ 452 in that this is a noun phase being replaced by a proper noun whereas CFJ 452 was a proper noun replacing another proper noun.

The difference here is that a proper noun is unambiguous but a noun phrase always contains some ambiguity due to the imprecise nature of the English language. It is my belief that the interpretation of the phrase with the least ambiguity should be the one adopted.

It is interesting that the initiator mentions CFJ 452 in eir reasoning, because the original judge for that CFJ (coincidentally the same judge for this CFJ) discussed this exact situation - a noun phrase being usurped by a proper noun - and showed why it would not succeed. The Supreme Court, in its reasoning, explicitly acknowledged and agreed with this assessment.

The lexical content of the two strings is identical, but the semantic content is different. This has come up before, and I discussed it at length in CFJ 452. The English language, as well as game custom, allows allows this to happen. Malenkai's Loophole works when there is no semantic dissonance between the hijacker and hijackee, and fails in all other cases. In my judgement, this (potential) name change does not change the customary interpretation of rule 1. 'No other players' in the quoted passage of rule 1 is not ambiguous, it clearly means the negative of the players listed in the preceeding sentence. A name change to 'No other players' is something else and can happen, as long as is happens as described in the rules.

I will also note that 'No other players' in rule 1 is not naming an entity, to tie off a potential loose end.

The Registrar acked the name change on the 29th, and the name, AFAIK, as not been changed since, hence the statement I was asked to judge is FALSE.

In the reasoning on CFJ 474 it was decided that when a phrase in a rule could not be determined unambiguously it should be determined randomly. I believe that this is what should be done here.

The Court agrees completely with the statements of the original judge and has nothing more to add.

To answer the specific issue addressed by the appealer's reasoning: CFJ 474 dealt with a situation in which a rule named a class of objects, requiring that a single member of that class be used while failing to specify which one. To apply that logic here, one would have to argue that the phrase "No other players" in Rule 1 is meant to refer to a member of a class, that class presumably being all objects that could possibly be referred to as "No other players". In other words, that "No other players" refers to 1) any entity with that name, and 2) any players besides those just mentioned in the previous sentence; and furthermore that it refers to all of these possibilities simultaneously, while at the same time indicating that it actually only applies to one of them. The Court sees no justification for such an interpretation.

Penalty to the appealer: 10 points.