CALL FOR JUDGEMENT ARCHIVE (266-280)

Call For Judgement 266 - Wed, 28 Aug 1996 00:43:49 -0400
Subject: Scoring question
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: Mellon (selected Aug 20, 1996, 11:26h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE at Thu, 22 Aug 1996 21:43:28 -0400
Appealed by: Habeous Corpus
Supreme Court's judgement: TRUE

Statement:

If a short, harfy, modest proposal containing the words "cows eat grass" is accepted, then the points for the proposal being short, harfy, and containing "cows eat grass" are halved, by rule 1109.

[none - Cotc]

The issue here is a conflict between some rules (R207 scoring, R1112.2 - harfy, R728 - silly) stating how much an author of a proposal is going to score, and another rule (R1109 - modest) that states only e shall only score half as much if the proposal is modest.

The conflict is solved by R210: R1109 states that it takes precedence over the other rules in the conflict.

R207 does not state anything about precedence, so R1109 wins over this one.

Same for R728.

R1112.2 states it takes precedence over rules that "would deny such a bonus" which includes R1109, but since R1109 has a lower number, so it wins over R1112.2 according to R210.

The verdict of this CFJ is True.

The Judgement on CFJ 266 was based on which Rules had Precedence over the others; this should have been immaterial. Rule 1109 (Modesty) only addresses Proposal scoring "as a direct result of authoring an adopted proposal".

While categorizing a Proposal as "Modest" or silly are definitely " a direct result of authoring an adopted proposal", and I admit there might be currently or in the near future other categories that would fit this description, "Hary" is _NOT_ one of them.

Proposals are determined to be Harfy not as a direct result of authorship, but in the judgement of another party. Points awarded as such should be subject to the limitation of Rule 1109, regardless of Precedence; Precedence is not relevant: categorization determines the applicability of R1109.

Therefore, CFJ 266 should be overturned and a Judgement of FALSE rendered.

The Court agrees with Habeous Corpus that precedence does not matter, except to establish that R 1109 does what it claims to do, when appropriate.

From R 1109:

> Whenever a Modest Proposal is adopted, the number of points scored by
> its author as a direct result of authoring an adopted proposal shall
> be half the number of points they would otherwise have scored
> (rounded down).

As Habeous Corpus points points out, this CFJ boils down to whether the qualities of the proposal mentioned in the CFJ statement (short, harfy, and contains "cows eat grass") are "points scored [...] as a direct result of authoring [...]".

The Court finds that they are. Habeous Corpus, justifiably so, questions whether or not "harfy" should fall into this category. While the Court can see the reason for this opinion, R 1112.2 says:

> [The Harfy Bonus] is considered a score change based on the content
> of the proposal.

The Court renders "direct result of authoring" to be score changes based on the content of authored proposals, as opposed to other types of score changes applied when a proposal is adopted. Had the above clause not been in R 1112.2, the Court probably would have found for Habeous Corpus' position.

The Court thus finds the statement on which judgement was called is TRUE.

The Court also notes that the bonus for a palidromic, modest proposal would also be halved, by similar reasoning, although don't expect to see that soon, especially one with the phrase "cows eat grass".

Call For Judgement 267 - Fri, 23 Aug 1996 17:53:24 -0400
Subject: Coup
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Brinjal (selected Aug 21, 1996, 20:44h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The "proposal entitled "Coup I"", as referred to in proposals 1142 thru 1150, is proposal 1141.

Its obvious. It can be no other proposal. Even if another proposal comes along and claims to be "Coup I", there is no compelling reason to select that one over P 1141. The game custom that currently makes P 1141 the referrant proposal cannot just be changed like that.

Just trying to anticipate /dev/joe. This is going to look stupid if I'm wrong.

At the time of writing there is no other proposal called "Coup I", so there can be no ambiguity and I must judge the statement TRUE.

Call For Judgement 268 - Thu, 05 Sep 1996 18:29:25 -0400
Subject: Coup I
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: Malenkai (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Wayne (selected Aug 23, 1996, 18:38h New York Time) (failed to deliver verdict)
3rd Judge: breadbox (selected Sep 02, 1996, 22:01h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

If proposal 1141 is rejected, and then one of proposals 1142-1150 is accepted, the 'proposal entitled "Coup I"' referred to in the accepted proposal will be proposal 1152.

[none - CotC]

First, I note that rule 703/5 categorically exempts proposals from the requirement of entities having unique names. Furthermore, if proposals were not exempt, the procedure it outlines to determine if two names are the same would conclude that proposals 1141 and 1152 have the same name.

/dev/joe claims that after proposal 1141 had been rejected, the term 'proposal entitled "Coup I"' would refer, unambiguously, to proposal 1152. But proposal 1141 continues to exist after it has been voted on. It does not stop being proposal 1141, thus neither does it stop being a proposal entitled "Coup I". The conclusion, therefore, is that from the time of the creation of proposal 1152, the term 'proposal entitled "Coup I"' is an ambiguous statement. If any of the proposals 1142-1150 had been accepted, it would have to be considered an indeterminate rule without a CFJ, or a falling back on game custom, or some other such mechanism to satsfactorily resolve its meaning.

Call For Judgement 269 - Tue, 17 Sep 1996 19:59:30 -0400
Subject: Harfy Paradox
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Pascal (selected Aug 25, 1996, 13:18h New York Time) (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Breadbox (selected Aug 26, 1996, 19:00h New York Time) (failed to respond)
3rd Judge: Habeous Corpus (selected Aug 29, 1996, 19:45h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE at Mon, 02 Sep 1996 21:18:15 EDT
Appealed by Wayne (without comment) at Sep 3, 15:50 EDT
Supreme court's Judgement: TRUE at Mon, 09 Sep 1996 19:47:32 -0400
Appealed by breadbox at Tue, 10 Sep 1996 08:51:39 -0400
Supreme court's Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

It cannot be determined with finality whether the Harfmeister is permitted to declare a proposal under consideration Harfy, if three other such proposals are currently designated as Harfy.

The reasoning is identical to that of CFJ 256, and CFJ 256's result establishes game custom that these types of self-inconsistent rules are paradoxes, and should be interpreted thusly.

The self-inconsistent sections from R 1112.1:

> The Harfmeister may designate proposals currently under consideration
> (in the voting queue) as Harfy, by publically announcing that he or
> she is doing so.

> No more than three proposals may be designated as Harfy at the same 
> time.

The first sentence *allows* all proposals to be designated as Harfy, provided the Harfmeister follows a prescribed procedure.

The second sentence, however, *prohibits* the Harfmeister from designating certain proposals as Harfy.

Thus it is indeterminate. We cannot tell which sentence is to have precedence, just as we couldn't tell whether section (ii) or (iii) had precedence in the old R 514, leaving the only possible rendering a paradox, as was rendered in CFJ 256 (qv).

The parallels to CFJ 256 are stunning. Section (ii) of R 514 *appeared* to introduce a broad class of contracts which were enforceable, where section (iii) *appeared* to introduce a qualifier to restrict the pool of which contracts in (ii) were actually enforceable. Beacause the apparantly qualifiying section was not joined by "unless", "except if", "and", or "otherwise", the paradox rendering was found "to be more reasonable than the non-paradox reading".

R 1112.1 *appears*, in a sentence, to introduce broad conditions under which a proposal may be declared Harfy, where the following sentence *appears* to introduce a qualifier to restrict the pool of which proposals may be declared Harfy. Beacause the apparantly qualifiying sentence is not joined by "unless", "except if", "and", or "otherwise", the paradox rendering must be found "to be more reasonable than the non-paradox reading".

CFJ 256 only showed the paradox for a subclass of contracts (Blue Cross contracts), as this only shows the paradox for a subclass of proposals (those in excess of three, or those by the Harfmeister (see below; I didn't want to submit a second CFJ for that case, just as ThinMan did not submit a second CFJ 256 for Silver Stripes)).

The fact that one is couched in prosiac sentences and the other in sections should hold no sway whatsoever. If it does, we've got bigger problems. All the section designations in the old R 514 do is add whitespace.

I also point out another self-inconsistent section of the rule (proposals submitted by the Harfmeister, alluded to above), which will arrive at the same paradox:

> The Harfmeister may not designate his or her own proposals as Harfy 

Upon a verdict of TRUE, the initiator will win in accordance with R 219.

Hrm. Although I really think the answer to this is FALSE, I'll have to decline judgement; I'm not sure I know precedent and the rules well enough to decide this one completely accurately.

To me, the first paragraph simply says _who_ can make proposals harfy and _how_ e does; It is not a generalization, but two restrictions, and the next paragraph is simply another, as well as the one disallowing auto-harfydesignation.

That's just my reading of the rules, tho'...

I almost let Malenkai get away with this one. If e had not added that last qualifier - "if three other such proposals are currently designated as Harfy".

Malenkai attempts to parallel Rule 1112 with Rule 514. I find this reasoning faulty; R1112 only states "proposals currently under consideration" without specifying the number or any other conditions. I take this to mean that previously resolved proposals and RFC's and non-proposal statements, etc. are excluded from being considered Harfy. If R1112 had stated something like "all rules in the current voting que" or an equivalent, then I could have agreed with eir reasoning. R514 was specific about what was a "valid Contract" then contradicted itself outright in the next section.

I have no problem with Malenkai's reasoning that there is no semantic or systemic difference between a "numbered section", paragraph, or successive sentence. But since the earlier sentence did nothing to specifically include "all" proposals in the voting que, I must assume that a direct modifier following immediately afterward is valid without the necessity of a qualifying term such as "except" or "but".

Malenkai's second point was very relevant, in that it does establish a exclusionary condition not previously establish or qualified. This could indeed be interpreted to result in a paradox. Unfortunately, Malenkai's Statement was specific in detailing the condition for determining the paradox; one which does not hold up in this judge's opinion. If eir Statement had included the exclusionary language as explicitly as it spelled out the other, I might have seen it eir way.

Based on the content of the Statement and the argument supporting that Statement only, this CFJ is Judged FALSE.

[none - CotC]

Although the relevant section of R 1112.1 is not perfectly logically equivalent to that of former rule 514, the Court concurs with the initiator that R 1112.1 does contain a paradox of the same kind that 514 contained. The verdict of CFJ 269 is therefore overturned to TRUE.

At Sep 13 09:20 the court agreed to a 1 point penalty for Habeous Corpus.

This CFJ claims that Rule 1112.1 is inconsistent, and the original reasoning for this CFJ attempts to draw a parallel with CFJ 256, which found Rule 514, or what was then Rule 514, to be internally inconsistent. The two situations are NOT the same.

Consider the inconsistent rule that was 514. I quote the relevant parts:

>    (ii) A Contract is Enforceable iff the behaviours it regulates are
>    among the following list:
>
>    a) The transfer of currency from Player to Player
>    b) A vote of YES or NO on one or more Proposals by Player
>    c) The transfer of an Ackanomic entity   [...]
>    (iii) A Contract is not Enforceable if any behaviour it regulates
>    violates any of the rules.

These two passages do contradict each other, but only by the usage, in section (ii), of "iff", the logician's abbreviation for "if and only if". The statement "X iff Y" indicates "X if Y" AND "X only if Y". It says that Y is the only condition necessary or possible to determine the truth of X. Thus the sentence in section (iii), which adds a further conditional, contradicts section (ii).

[Now if section (ii) has stated "A Contract is Enforceable ONLY IF the behaviours it regulates are on the following list ...", then it would have prevented any other situations from making a contract enforceable, but would have left open the possibility that a contract that met the stated requirements might still be not enforceable, and there would be no inconsistency with (iii).]

This is not the situation in Rule 1112.1. I quote the allegedly contradictory statements:

> The Harfmeister may designate proposals currently under consideration
> (in the voting queue) as Harfy, by publically announcing that he or
> she is doing so.   [...]
> No more than three proposals may be designated as Harfy at the same
> time.

The rule does not state that the Harfmeister may do so if and only if the proposal is in the voting queue, or if and only if a public announcement is made. It does not even use an umbrella term, such as "any or all proposals." The phrase "The Harfmeister may designate proposals" cannot be construed as claiming that all restrictions on this ability are to be found within that sentence. Nothing about its phrasing indicates that it is the last word on how the ability can be used. Is it not more reasonable to read it as merely identifying an ability which belongs to the Harfmeister, to be used upon proposals?

As an analogy, consider the statement: "A heart attack may kill its victim." That statement is not contradicted by the fact that heart attacks often do not kill their victims. And it is certainly not in the same class as the statement "A person is killed if and only if he or she is the victim of a heart attack!"

Furthermore: I claim that the above reading is not only more reasonable, but is also upheld by game custom. As proof I offer the following selections from the current rule set.

• * From Rule 818/3: "A player may wear a Prosthetic Forehead that they own ... After a player removes a Prosthetic Forehead, his real head is sore for 48 hours and she may not wear a Prosthetic Forehead during this time." Does the second sentence impose limits on the first sentence? Yes. Do they contradict each other? No.
• * From Rule 891/1: "Any player may start a newspaper, by publically declaring that they are doing so.... A small fee of A$20 must be paid to the treasury to cover start-up costs." Does the fact that a player with less than A$20 cannot start a newspaper make the first sentence invalid? No.
• * More in the style of the subject under debate are these examples from Rule 423/1: "A player may retract their own proposal by making a request to the public forum. The proposal may be retracted only if the results have not been publicly announced," and Rule 578/10: "A player may retract their own Call For Judgement (CFJ) by making a request to the public forum. The proposal may be retracted only if the judge has not decided on the outcome or the judge chosen has not accepted judgement on the CFJ."
• * Wait, it gets better. Rule 508/3 begins by stating: "The players that are also Justices ... have the following powers.... They may nullify a Presidential decision.... They may nullify a Senatorial decision.... They may nullify a previous Supreme Court decision." It continues by stating that such powers are exercised via AOJs. The next paragraph states: "The following types of AOJs are explicitly prohibited ... An AOJ to nullify a Presidential Decision to appoint a particular player to the Supreme Court.... An AOJ to nullify a Senatorial Decision to confirm a particular player to the Supreme Court.... An AOJ that nullifies a decision made 7 days or more prior to the time of the (attempted) AOJ.
• * Finally, consider the following, from Rule 569/10: "After any Judgement is returned, a player may appeal the case to the Supreme Court for consideration.... A player may not make more than 3 appeals of the same CFJ."

There are undoubtedly more examples of a similar nature. If the Supreme Court allows their decision on CFJ 269 to stand, then all of these rules, and more, will have to be rewritten.

[By contrast, there is not a single place in the current ruleset where "if and only if" gives a contradictory reading by the definition I have used here.]

I humbly beg the court to carefully examine all of these observations, and reconsider their previous decision.

breadbox is correct that the logic of R1112.1 is not identical to that of R514. This Court acknowledged that in its previous decision on this case. We do not, however, accept breadbox's argument against the truth of the CFJ statement.

breadbox states that "The phrase 'The Harfmeister may designate proposals' cannot be construed as claiming that all restrictions on this ability are to be found within that sentence." On the contrary, the Court could and did so construe that sentence in its previous ruling.

This boils down to a tricky question of context. It is this Court's opinion that in the absence of qualifying language, each independant sentence or independent collection of dependant sentences in a rule must be interpreted independantly. This court notes that qualification may be applied "retroactively" and in other sentences or parts of the rule than the one being interpreted, for instance with language such as "Notwithstanding the other provisions of this rule [...]."

The Court notes that breadbox's supposed analogy is not, in fact, analogous; the usage of "may" in his sentence is equivalent to "might," whereas the usage of "may" in the contested sentence of R1112.1 is equivalent to "is permitted to."

Finally, this Court rejects breadbox's game custom argument based on rules with similar conflicts. There have been no instances where the conflicts in those rules have been interpreted as non-conflicting (despite the fact that it almost happened with Newspapers), so no game custom has been established in that area. The fact that several rules have now been discovered to contain conflicting language does not invalidate the previous judgement of this Court.

Call For Judgement 270 -
Subject: Party Chess Purchases
Initiator: Niccolo Flychuck
Judge: Brinjal (selected Aug 25, 1996, 18:09h New York Time)
Judgement: retracted by Niccolo Flychuck, Mon, 26 Aug 1996 02:02:10 +0300 (EET DST)

Statement:

Robin Hood never purchased PartyChessPieces because at the time he made his anouncement of purchase there were PartyChessPieceDef rules.

while there were some rules which were very similar to PartyChessPieceDef rules, their titles did not conform to the description in R990. There no were no rules with titles that included the words "Creation of a PartyChessPiece " although there were some that included the words "Creation of PartyChessPiece " According to R990 only pieces which are defined by PartyChessPieceDef rules can be purchased. therefore Robin Hood could not have purchased pieces which did not exist.

notes (which are not part of the reasoning):
(Judging this CFJ TRUE would allow Robin Hood to purchase those pieces at the current prices, and anull the previous purchase. Judging it false would just leave them where they are, at the hands of the NAP Swinger I believe - someone please correct me if I'm wrong. This is nothing against Robin Hood, I just want to get this straight now, before the pieces are actually on the board,a TRUE verdict would eliminate the necessity of proposing a refund)

Call For Judgement 271 - Sun, 25 Aug 1996 23:21:20 -0400
Subject: Party Chess Purchases
Initiator: Niccolo Flychuck
Judge: Malenkai (selected Aug 25, 1996, 21:35h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Robin Hood never purchased PartyChessPieces because at the time he made his anouncement of purchase there were no PartyChessPieceDef rules.

while there were some rules which were very similar to PartyChessPieceDef rules, their titles did not conform to the description in R990. There were no rules with titles that included the words "Creation of a PartyChessPiece " although there were some that included the words "Creation of PartyChessPiece " According to R990 only pieces which are defined by PartyChessPieceDef rules can be purchased. therefore Robin Hood could not have purchased pieces which did not exist.

notes (which are not part of the reasoning):
(Judging this CFJ TRUE would allow Robin Hood to purchase those pieces at the current prices, and anull the previous purchase. Judging it false would just leave them where they are, at the hands of the NAP Swinger I believe - someone please correct me if I'm wrong. This is nothing against Robin Hood, I just want to get this straight now, before the pieces are actually on the board,a TRUE verdict would eliminate the necessity of proposing a refund)

From R 990, section 2. D:

> (i) Any player may announce at any time that e is purchasing a new
> Party Chess Piece. 
> (ii) The Party Chess Piece must be a piece defined by a
> PartyChessPieceDef rule 

A verdict of UNDECIDED appeared necessary, given the CFJ 256/269 style paradox here, as section (i) appeared to allow Robin Hood to purchase a Party Chess Piece by announcing he was doing so, whilst section (ii) appeared to prevent such by the fact that there are no such pieces (or at least the specific pieces he attempted to purchase) defined by a PartyChessPieceDef rule. (We'll need a RHG Tree soon; no fair using this one, but there are dozens of others in the rules, I suppose).

Just before sending it off, however, I checked Robin Hood's actual e-mail, which reads:

> I hereby purchase 1 copycat, 1 il-Nabi, 1 echo and 10 pawns, in that
> order.
> I will also be a spectator for party chess.

He did not claim to buy any Party Chess Pieces explictly, so did he do so implictly? None of the rules which defined the entities in question claimed that the entities are Party Chess Pieces, nor did R 990 or any other rules, due to the missing article "a" in the title of the specific entity rules.

The entities are protected, therefore Robin Hood did not purchase them, or anything called a Party Chess Piece. Had the CFJ statement simply been "Robin Hood never purchased PartyChessPieces", a verdict of TRUE would have been necessary.

The initiator, however, is asking me to judge not only that statement, but the *reason* the pieces were not purchased, because there is a 'because' clause: "because at the time he made his anouncement of purchase there were no PartyChessPieceDef rules."

The 'because' clause is FALSE. R 994 was a PartyChessPieceDef rule at the referrant time of this CFJ's statement. As the 'because' clause is FALSE, it could not have been the reason Robin Hood did not purchase the pieces, therefore the statement on which I was asked to judge is FALSE.

In other news, I note that no pieces appear to be purchasable until the paradox in R 990 is cleaned up (P 1160 will do this, it appears).

Also, and I have to get this out, its obvious that he bought these pieces. Instead, we're haggling over a missing article "a" and the results of CFJ 256, both of which are over the edge, IMHO.

Wasn't there a song or proposal or something entitled "I Should be Allowed to Think"?

Call For Judgement 272 - Tue, 03 Sep 1996 19:51:23 -0400
Subject: Party Chess Purchases
Initiator: Niccolo Flychuck
Judge: Habeous Corpus (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: snowgod (selected Aug 27, 1996, 08:53h New York Time) (declined to judge)
3rd Judge: breadbox (selected Aug 28, 1996, 19:24h New York Time) (failed to respond)
4th Judge: Mellon (selected Sep 02, 1996, 21:33h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

Robin Hood did not purchase any PartyChessPieces before this CFJ was submitted.

Basically, the same reasoning for CFJ 271. Note that this is not the same statement as CFJ 271, and it also requests that the judge make a decision about the situation at the Robin Hood made his declaration. By the the time this is distributed Robin Hood might well decide again to make a pruchase, and I only want to clear up the situation one way or another, I really don't care which way it goes, I just want to be clear on this.

Malenkai have already done all the work for me in his verdict of CFJ 271, I just had to check and verify his reasoning there:

[...]

> The entities are protected, therefore Robin Hood did not purchase them,
> or anything called a Party Chess Piece.  Had the CFJ statement simply
> been "Robin Hood never purchased PartyChessPieces", a verdict of TRUE
> would have been necessary.

[etc...]

I agree with Malenkai. And the statement in the quote is equivalent with the one I'm asked to judge, so my verdict is TRUE.

Call For Judgement 273 - Tue, 03 Sep 1996 19:57:31 -0400
Subject: Bond Cycle
Initiator: ThinMan
Judge: Robin Hood (selected Aug 29, 1996, 08:31h New York Time) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: Habeous Corpus (selected Sep 02, 1996, 21:50h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The "appropriate week" for the current two-week bond cycle to end is the week containing the day exactly two weeks after the cycle began.

The other possibility is the week containing the first Monday at least two weeks after the cycle began. The rules are unclear on this matter, but I see no basis for a paradox claim -- the matter can and will be cleared up by judicial decision. I selected the above interpretation to CFJ first because of the timing issues.

Both possibilities raised in ThinMan's Statement and Reasoning are equally TRUE. Bond Cycles are independant of Game Cycles (ref. R666 para. h and j). Therefore, the two week cycles always start and end on a Monday. Hence the the Statement is judged TRUE.

Call For Judgement 274 - Tue, 03 Sep 1996 19:54:14 -0400
Subject: CFCJ Appeals
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: ThinMan (selected Sep 02, 1996, 22:26h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

If a CFCJ is appealed, and a verdict of TRUE is upheld, the appellate court may impose a penalty different from the previously imposed penalty.

[none - CotC]

Here are what appear to be the relevant sections of the rules:

From rule 710/5 ("Criminal Justice"):

7a) Upon a verdict of TRUE, the judge may retain or alter the recommended penalty. The result will become the actual penalty. [...]

8b) If a TRUE verdict is not upheld on an appeal, any penalties, except SENTENCE, are reversed [...].

From rule 569/10 ("Overturning Judgements):

[...] The Court is under no obligation to consider such material, and should use normal procedures to determine a verdict.

The Supreme Court must then decide the case and return its verdict within one week. With the verdict of a majority of the Justices being the verdict of the Court. [...]

The rules do not explicitly provide for the Supreme Court to modify a sentence when it upholds a TRUE CFCJ verdict, but it is possible that such a provision is implicit.

This judge finds rule 569 relevant to the question only in that it establishes the terminology that a Supreme Court decision is a "verdict." Based on this, one could argue that the situation described in the CFJ statement satisfies the condition of R710, section 7a.

What would be the effect of that, however? R710, sec. 7a says that "the judge" may retain or alter the suggested penalty. It makes no reference to the Supreme Court or to Justices. There is no provision for the Appellate Court to set a different penalty, but perhaps the original judge would have the option to modify the sentence. Thankfully, I am not required to decide that question.

On the other hand, R710 sets out specific procedures to be performed if a TRUE verdict is overturned on appeal. R710 therefore claims sufficient scope to resolve questions concerning results of CFCJ appeals.

Decision:

I find no wording among the rules that would allow the Supreme Court or any other appellate court to modify the original penalty assessed on a CFCJ without overturning the decision. I therefore find the CFCJ False.

Call For Judgement 275 - Fri, 06 Sep 1996 12:35:47 -0400
Subject: Acting Swingers
Initiator: Malenkai
1st Judge: snowgod (selected Sep 03, 1996, 00:14h New York Time) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: ThinMan (selected Sep 06, 1996, 01:10h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

Choosing Party Chess Pieces, and making moves in the game of Party Chess, are privileges, and not duties, of the Office of Swinger.

The rules are silent on the issue, as least as far as I can tell. To me, choosing the pieces and playing the game seem more like a privilege than a duty, that is why I am uncomfortable proceeding in an acting capacity without a CFJ.

I note that the CFJ can be judged FALSE with one part of the and clause in the statement being TRUE. I ask the judge to at least clarify that, if it is the case; I did not feel like submitting two CFJs.

The rules are indeed unclear on the issue. The Party Chess rules state that Swingers "may" choose pieces and "may" make moves. That does not, however, establish conclusively that these are not duties.

Rule 609 defines the terms in question:

The Duties of an Office are the tasks that the Officer(s) are expected to carry out to facilitate the conduct of Ackanomic business. Duties tend to be typified by the compilation, maintenance, and distribution of information.

the Officer(s) receive according to the Rules regulating the Office. Examples can include the receipt of Ackanomic currency, the ability to cast extra votes in certain circumstance, or special consideration with regards to making appointments or issuing CFJ decisions.

Choosing pieces and making moves in Party Chess do not fit well with the examples of either duties or privileges. If we interpret "Ackanomic business" to include Party Chess, then the actions in question must be interpreted to be duties. Otherwise, I can only interpret them to be privileges.

What, then, is the business of Ackanomic? By reference to the rules, the only recourse I have is to consider the duties assigned to various offices. Just as Rule 609 says, they all relate to the compilation, maintenance, and distribution of information, especially information relating to proposals, voting, Judgements, and Ackanomic entities.

I conclude that selecting Party Chess pieces and playing Party Chess are not duties of the Office of Swinger. The Rules do not establish that all actions allowed or required of Offices are either duties or privileges, but in my opinion it is game custom that that is so. It is therefore the case that selecting Party Chess pieces and making moves in Party Chess are privileges of the Office of Swinger.

Call For Judgement 276 - Wed, 18 Sep 1996 19:34:40 -0400
Subject: Acting Justices
Initiator: Wayne
Judge: /dev/joe (selected Sep 04, 1996, 21:38h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE at Fri, 06 Sep 1996 08:51:18 -0400
Appealed by Wayne (without comment) at Sep 9, 12:47 EDT
Supreme Court's judgement: TRUE

Statement:

An Acting Justice is not a Justice, but is a player who performs the duties of a Justice.

Rule 507 states that the Supreme Court "will be composed of two players (called Justices)..."

It would be a violation of R507 if we had three Justices. Unless one of the Regular Justices was removed from office, the Acting Justice could not be considered a Justice.

For the case of players appointed to perform vacationing officers' jobs by Rule 457, that rule specifies that the appointments must be made in accordance with rule 609, section (i), which states, in part:

"A Seat is either held by one Player or it is vacant."

Therefore, an acting justice by rule 457 does not hold a seat in the supreme court, and is therefore not a justice. The case of appointing one justice to be acting justice for the other seat is also disallowed, by another part of rule 609, section (i):

"No player may hold more than one seat for a given Office, including any seat held in an acting capacity"

I note that rule 609, section (iv) states that there can only be an Acting Officer for a seat when that seat is vacant; however, rule 457, which allows for the appointment of acting officers for officers on vacation, has precedence over this part of rule 609.

All other cases where the rules allow for an acting justice (as far as I can see, this occurs only when a justice is being impeached) agree with the definition in rule 609, section (iv). Again it is made clear that the acting officer does not hold a seat in the office.

Thus the first part of the statement is true.

The second part of the statement says that an acting justice is a player who performs the duties of a justice. Rules 457 and 609 agree on this issue; this part of the statement is also true.

[none]

The Court concurs with the original Judge.

Call For Judgement 277 - Sun, 22 Sep 1996 11:57:32 -0400
Subject: Suspending the Suspended Sentence
Initiator: /dev/joe
1st Judge: this is not a name (selected Sep 05, 1996, 09:16h New York Time) (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: Robin Hood (selected Sep 05, 1996, 18:51h New York Time) (declined to judge)
3rd Judge: Brinjal (selected Sep 08, 1996, 13:26h New York Time) (failed to respond)
4th Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected Sep 12, 1996, 13:26h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The "sentence" part of the penalty assigned to this is not a name by IdiotBoy in CFCJ 113 is not one of the allowed classes of penalties for a CFCJ, so this part of the penalty should be ignored.

That penalty was:

A SENTENCE of 2 days in the Gaol for this is not a name, suspended until such time as another CFCJ judgement or TRUE is returned against this is not a name.

Rule 710 allows for a sentence in Gaol to be given as a penalty on a CFCJ judged TRUE, but it specifically defines when the sentence should be carried out. No rule allows for a "suspended sentence" to be given.

I agree with /dev/joe's reasoning

Call For Judgement 278 - Fri, 06 Sep 1996 08:57:43 -0400
Subject: Bothered by bugs
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: breadbox (selected Sep 05, 1996, 22:58h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Each and every time Phoebe's matchbox is missing, and there is no officer in charge of random things, the Registrar must indicate that he or she cannot be bothered to determine who found it for the Registrar to be relieved of the duty.

The other reading of R 730 is that once the Registrar indicates that he or she cannot be bothered, such is assumed without action required on the part of the Registrar each time.

I believe the reading in the statement of this CFJ is more accurate than the above, but don't really care (my 30 sided die has been working pretty well lately). I do want to follow the rules though.

The key word in the sentence is "must." Nothing in the rules proscribes how the Registrar indicates that e can't be bothered. That is the business of the Registar and the Speaker alone. Either of the "readings" given by Malenkai above are within the rules.

If the Registrar tells the Speaker that e can't be bothered to deal with deciding random things except on 20th and 22nd of months ending in "ember," and the Speaker understands this and acts accordingly, then they have followed the rules.

Call For Judgement 279 - Sun, 15 Sep 1996 21:50:49 -0400
Subject: Temporal Justice
Initiator: Guy Fawkes
Judge: Niccolo Flychuck (selected Sep 09, 1996, 19:58h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

If a CFJ is submitted, and before a verdict is reached, the rules pertaining to that CFJ are changed, the CFJ must be judged under the ruleset under which it was subitted.

With the way CFJ is bouncing about in the midst of rapid-fire proposals, I was just curious. R 215's "then in effect" (when in effect?) and R 589's "current ruleset" (current at submission or deliverance?) are rather ambiguous.

Guy Fawkes is correct is stating that R215 and R589 are ambigous. Due to this ambiguity I have to rely on game custom. In the past, it has been customary to judge CFJs according to the rules in effect at the time the CFJ was invoked. Hence, "then" has always been interpreted as "when the CFJ was invoked". This does raise a question as to the customary interpretation of the phrase "current ruleset" , which we can either interpret as "current at the time of submission" which would be consistent with the custom as to the interpretation of R215, or "current at the time of deliverance". Again, the same game custom suggests that it is the former which guided us thus far. (One might argue precedence here, but we are dealing with game custom, and I feel that precedence might be too weak an argument, if at all applicable).
The above reasoning, IMO, suffices to support a judgement of TRUE.

I can present additional customs that support this. The thread splitting custom, started by Malenkai, I believe, allows us to 'rewind' some actions, back to the time the CFJ was invoked, depending on its outcome - this is a clear indicator that the game state at the time the CFJ was submitted, part of which is the ruleset, is the one that has guided us in judgements so far.
(this is a good place to make a refference to that article about retractable errors, but I had already the next paragraph and discovered that I neglected to do so. If I did remember to make that refference - this would be the spot.

I think that the problem arises partially from the fact the Suber originally conceived the game as a turn based game played around a table. In a turn-based nomic, under the initial ruleset, at least, game play stops until a CFJ is decided. Thus Game State is 'frozen' and there is no question which ruleset to consider, there is only one ruleset. If such a nomic were to change the rules to a non turn based game, where many things happen simultaneouly, like in e-nomic, then such problems would certainly plague that game as well.
The CFJ concept has been adopted pretty much in its entirety - but in time we found many creative ways to make it work for us, and we'll probably continue to make adjustments - all part of the fun of nomic.

This would be a good place to stop - I could go on for hours about how the medium affects the character of nomic, and so could most other players here.

Call For Judgement 280 - Sat, 14 Sep 1996 10:51:45 -0400
Subject: Paradox Wins
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: breadbox (selected Sep 09, 1996, 21:17h EDT)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

After a CFJ of the type described in rule 219 is judged true, the player who submitted it does not win until the 4 day appeal period passes and the CFJ is not appealed in that time.

Rule 219 says, in part:

If the statement is judged true, and the judgement is not overruled, then the player who called for judgement is declared the winner of the game.

Since it cannot be known whether or not the judgement will be overruled until its appeal period passes and the CFJ is not appealed, the "then" clause in the excerpt of rule 219 above cannot be followed until after the appeal period ends.

I believe we have done this incorrectly with the 3 previous paradox wins, and that we also now have the machinery in place to legally ignore the resulting scoring errors, given the time since they occurred.

What can I say? Rule 219, which has not changed since the beginning of the game, is quite explicit on the subject. It does not defer to other rules, and no other rules claim precedence over it, or indeed even mention the subject. Case closed.