CALL FOR JUDGEMENT ARCHIVE (236-250)

Call For Judgement 236 - Thu, 18 Jul 1996 09:12 -0400
Subject: Blue Cross
Initiator: snowgod
Judge: this is not a name
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

Malenkai currently has a Blue Cross

message sent to ackanomic@wilma.che.utexas.edu on Sat, 13 Jul 1996 00:47:36 -0800:

>[shot opens with a full body view of acting senator snowgod standing
>before a massed crowd.  The ackanomic flag flies high in the background.
>As the senator begins to speak, the camera zooms in focusing on his face
>and prosthetic forhead.]
>
>In appreciation for his outstanding service to the game of Ackanomic, the
>passage of 20 or more proposals, I am awarding a Blue Cross to Malenkai.
>I hope this cross provides comfort to malenkai in this time of crises,
>while his previous cross remains locked away in the treasury.  Long live
>ackanomic!
>
>[closing shot of president /dev/joe twidleing his thumbs while ackanomic burns]

Rule 549 reads in part:

>     Blue Crosses and Silver Stripes are awarded by the President, the
>     Proconsul, or a Senator. Each time one is to be awarded, it is
>     created for the occasion by the Frobozz Magic Medal Company,
>     Ackanomic Division.

It is necessary to determine whether snowgod's award of a Blue Cross to Malenkai was legal, as he was an Acting Senator, not an elected Senator.

Rule 457 in part:
>     While a player is on vacation, the player shall not not be
>     randomly selected for anything. The player shall also not be
>     chosen to perform any task. The duties of any offices held by the
>     player shall be performed by the Speaker or someone appointed by
>     the Speaker.

It remains to be determined whether the awarding of a Blue Cross is a duty of the office of Senator.

No rule formally defines the duties of a Senator. The closest any rule comes is 609, which describes in general what can be considered the duties, privileges, etc. of offices. To quote from that rule:

>     (ii)  Duties:
>
>            The Duties of an Office are the tasks that the
>            Officer(s) are expected to carry out to facilitate
>            the conduct of Ackanomic business.  Duties tend to
>            be typified by the compilation, maintenance, and
>            distribution of information.

The awarding of a Blue Cross is not concerned with facilitating the conduct of Ackanomic business, nor does it have anything to do with compiling, maintaining, or distributing information.

>     (iii) Privileges:
>
>            The Privileges of an Office are the considerations
>            the Officer(s) receive according to the Rules
>            regulating the Office.  Examples can include the
>            receipt of Ackanomic currency, the ability to cast
>            extra votes in certain circumstance, or special
>            consideration with regards to making appointments
>            or issuing CFJ decisions.

The ability of a Senator to award a Blue Cross can be considered to be a Privilege of that office, as it fits better into this category than into the category of Duties. Although there is nothing preventing an action from simultaneously being a duty and a privilege (cf. CFJ 223), there is no reason to believe that awarding a Blue Cross is a duty of a Senator, particularly because it can be performed by several officers. Therefore I judge false on this CFJ.

Call For Judgement 237 - Thu, 25 Jul 1996 23:13 -0400
Subject: Acting Officers
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: this is not a name
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The penalties published, and reproduced below, for the Supreme Court's late appeal verdicts on CFJ 220, 232, and 234 are correct.

The published penalties were:

>Verdicts delivered:  22 Jul, 16:47

>220 was due 19 Jul, 21:23; overdue 2.81 days => 5.61 => A$5 penalty apiece
>232 was due 19 Jul, 22:24; overdue 2.85 days => 5.70 => A$5 penalty apiece
>234 was due 21 Jul, 15:28; overdue 0.95 days => 1.90 => A$1 penalty apiece

This was surprisingly difficult to figure, and rests on the contentious assumption that an Acting Justice is the same as a Justice. I wanted to run this by a Judge just to be sure.

Other facts:

Justice Bascule went on vacation sometime on July 11th and stayed on vacation until July 22, before the verdicts were delivered.

mr cwm went on vacation on July 10th and returned on July 15 at 10:40 EDT.

In both cases acting Justices were appointed on the day the actual Justices went on vacation, therefore the Court was fully staffed, by either Justice or Acting Justice, continuously, since July 11th.

1) So, if Acting Justices count, the vacation clause of R 569 had no effect, and it was calculated properly. Note also, if relavent, that R 457 has precedence.

2) If Acting Justices do not count, the last time a "majority" of Justices were on vacation, from above, was July 15, 10:40, when mr cwm came back. In this case, the verdicts were due July 22, 10:40, and therefore no penalties, after rounding, would be due for these 3 CFJs.

I claim 1) is the proper interpretation. What if the *Acting* Justices delivered a late verdict. Surely they should be penalized?

Note that I read "majority", as indicated by Webster, to be *greater* than 50%

I return a verdict of true on 237, noting that perhaps Acting Justices should not be permitted, as their existence has the potential to subvert the notion of an enlightened Supreme Court confirmed by the Senate.

Call For Judgement 238 - Thu, 25 Jul 1996 20:04 -0400
Subject: Undoing illegal effects of R 446
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Bascule (selected Jul 23, 1996, 22:40h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

Rules 510 and 793 are Mutable.

Rules 510 and 793 were allegedly transmuted to Immutable by the now defunct R 446. But rule 446 was wholly void and without affect since it became a rule change, therefore it could not have transmuted the rules to Immutable, as it claimed to.

I must demonstrate that R 446 was wholly void and without effect. This is unfortunate that I do it now, because the previous CotC lost my original CFJ on the issue, but I do want to get this correct.

The argument goes as follows, cut from my previous CFJ from 7 May, 1996:

I Call for Judgement on the following statement:

Rule 446/1 is wholly void and without effect, and previous applications of it were unlawful, and future applications of it will be unlawful.

Reasoning:

1) Second part first: If the rule can be shown, by the rules, to be "wholly void and without effect", then the past and future applications of the rule would be unlawful.

2) Showing R446 is "wholly void and without effect":

I quote from R108: "Mutable rules that are inconsistent in some way with some immutable rule (except by proposing to transmute it) are wholly void and without effect".

I quote from R446 (Mutable): "Any proposal that is voted AGAINST [my emphasis] unamiously creats a new rule [...]".

I quote from R104 (Immutable): [...] conditions must be satisfied for a proposal to be adopted [...] (2) The required number of votes must have been cast IN FAVOR [my emphasis] of the proposal [...]

Clearly these two statements are "inconsistent in some way". In fact, they are totally contradictory. As R104 is Immutable, and R446 is Mutable, R446 must be deemed "wholly void and without effect" by R108.

[The text of R 446/1 is not on the web page, unfortunately. The Judge will have to trust my quotes of it. It was the rule that said if all the votes are yes, or all the votes are no, on a proposal, it creates an immutable rule. The gist of my argument was that having all votes of no pass a proposal conflicts with immutable rule 104.

Note that R 104 has changed since then as well, but the version in effect at the time can be found in the initial ruleset on the web page]

Judge's Comments:

[none provided]

Call For Judgement 239 - Tue, 30 Jul 1996 19:34:31 -0400
Subject: Stalemated Party Chess
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: /dev/joe (selected Jul 23, 1996, 23:05h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE at Wed, 24 Jul 1996 18:23 -0400
Appealed by Malenkai at Wec, 24 Jul 1996 20:03 -0400
Supreme Court's Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The legality of continuing the game of Party Chess past the beginning stage cannot be determined with finality.

I quote from R 911:

"2. Managing the Game
A. At the begining of the game of Party Chess there are no Party Chess Pieces on the Party Board

B. Each Office of Swinger receives one King, and five playing pieces. Each Swinger may choose any five pieces which are defined be a PartyChessPieceDef rule, as long as their total material value does not exceed 30."

This is the beginning phase. Each swinger receives on King, and chooses 5 other pieces under the constraints of R 911, section 2B, above. Those constraints are: piece must be defined by a PartyChessPieceDef rule, and the sum total of all pieces "material value" must not exceed 30.

R 990 defines what a PartyChessPieceDef rule is. There is only one such rule, that is Rule 994/0 "Creation of a PartyChessPiece King". Therefore each Swinger is required to choose 5 Kings, as that is the only piece available, IF AND ONLY IF the material value of the Kings sums to 30 or less. This is where the game gets hung:

From 994 D: "The material value of the King is undefined"

It cannot be determined with finality whether choosing the 5 Kings is legal, because it cannot be determined whether their material value sums to 30, less than 30, or greater than 30, as it is undefined. Thus we cannot determine the legally of the game past this stage (the "beginning"), thus showing the Truth of the CFJ statement.

This constitutes a win by R 219 for the initiator.

I note that there is an argument that there is no Chess-Umpire, or Acting Chess-Umpire. This argument is spurious and should be disregarded by the Judge. The rule that makes the appointer the Acting Chess-Umpire takes precedence over the rule that prohibits a Swinger from being a Chess-Umpire.

Rule 990 does not actually define what a PartyChessPieceDef rule is; rather, it puts restrictions on what can be a PartyChessPieceDef rule. (hereafter abbreviated PCPD rule)

Nowhere in the rules is it stated that any rule is a PCPD rule.

Rule 990 does not specify that a rule which meets the criteria in section 3 is a PCPD rule, and Rule 994 does not claim to be one (although it meets some of the criteria for PCPD rules in Rule 990 section 3). If rule 994 did claim to be a PCPD rule, then it would be one (because section 5 of Rule 990 says that section 3 of Rule 990 defers to rule 994), but it does not do so.

PCPD rules are regulated (R990 section 3 does so in many ways) so Rule 115 cannot be used to make Rule 994 become a PCPD rule.

I can only conclude that no PCPD rules exist. It seems that PCPD rules are one of those things defined and regulated by rules, but which do not currently exist, just like contracts.

Rule 991, part 2.B. cannot be legally followed, because there is no way for a swinger to choose a piece defined by a PCPD rule, and thus the game cannot continue beyond this point.

/dev/joe's reasoning hinges on the fact that no PartyChessPieceDef (PCPD) rules exist. I claim that exactly one such rule exists, and that is rule 994. If R 994 is in fact, judged to be a PCPD rule, my original reasoning is valid.

Even if my reasoning is judged invalid, that does not necessarily make the statement of the CFJ false, I will consider that possibility after demonstrating that R 994 is a PCPD.

CFJ 228's reasoning has established that "belief" and "spirit of the game" can be used in judgements. That is all that is called for here. It is obvious that Rule 994/0 (Mutable) "Creation of a PartyChessPiece King" is a PartyChessPieceDef Rule.

R 990, which defines PCPD rules, does *not explicitly* say that a rule *must* declare itself a PCPD to be one. It instead lays down some criteria for being one. It seems reasonable to compare a rule to this criteria to determine if it fits. /dev/joe's argument is like saying that a duck must declare itself a duck a duck to be a duck (I won't continue this metaphor :)); that we can't just use common sense.

Lets look at R 990's definition of a PCPD, against R 994:

990> A. Each PartyChessPieceDef rule defines exactly one type of piece
990> that can be purchased and used in the game of Party Chess

R 994 defines one type of piece which can be used, but not purchased. R 990 explicitly defers precedence to 994, validating this exception, and allowing it to be a PCPD.

990> B. A PartyChessPieceDef rule must include in its title the words
990> 'Creation of PartyChessPiece'followed by the name of the piece

The title of R 994 is "Creation of a PartyChessPiece King"

990> C. A PartyChessPieceDef rule must define the legal moves a piece
990> can make. That is, define in a non-ambiugous way, which empty
990> squares on the Party Board the piece can move to. All such definition
990> are relative to the current square the piece occupies

From 994: "The king may move to a square (DestR,DestC) which belong to the set of all squares such that dC=1 /OR/ dR=1"

990> D. A PartyChessPieceDef rule may define different rules for 
990> capturing an opponent's piece. Capturing consists of moving into a
990> square occupied by an opponent's piece, removing the opponent's piece
990> from the board, and adding it to one's own off-board pieces. If a
990> PartyChessPieceDef rule does not define rules for capture, then the
990> rules defined for movement, are also the rules for capture. - i.e.
990> piece A can capture opponent's piece B, if B occupies a square, that,
990> had it been vacant, would have been legal for A to move into. 

994 does not define such rules, but it need not. Note the word "may", and the explicit contingency for when it does not.

990> F. A PartyChessPieceDef rule must define a material value for the
990> piece.

From 994: "The material value of the King is undefined". Again an exception, but again following the paradigm for defining a PCPD. As 990 has again explicitly deferred for the King, this again validates that the King is a PCPD, with a couple of exceptions anticipated by the template established by R 990. You could also argue that "undefined" is the material value defined for the piece, but that is not necessary.

990> G. A PartyChessPieceDef rule must define a non-space ASCII character
990> to represent the piece. The character must not be one that is
990> already used by another Party Chess Piece. These characters will
990> be used to represent the pieces on representation of the Party Board.

From 994 "The ASCII character representing the King is K."

I would also like the Court to look at the failed P 1007: (http://wilma.che.utexas.edu/~devjoe/acka/prop1050.html#P1007)

More PCPD rules. Compare them to R 994. None of the rules to be created by P 1007 specify explicitly that they are PCPD rules either, nor does R 990 require such. You can't specify everything; look at R 390. I'm not sure how you can interpret R 994 to not be a PCPD rule. The King is a Party Chess Piece defined by a PCPD rule.

It looks like we're going to spend more time debating Party Chess than playing it. I apologize for all the bandwidth use. Given that R 994 is a PCPD, please consider the original reasoning of CFJ 239.

Failing that, lets look at another argument (I said I was going to give the Court a run for its wallet. It could take 7 days to read this :)):

The Court must consider the Truth of the CFJ statement, even if the reasoning is invalid (which of course it is not):

>The legality of continuing the game of Party Chess past the beginning
>stage cannot be determined with finality.

/dev/joe puts forth a fair case in the reasoning provided with CFJ 240, and given the correctness of that reasoning or that CFJ's statement, we cannot determine with finality how to interpret the rules dealing with the King, and thus cannot determine the legality of playing past the beginning of the game. If that reasoning is true, we get hung in R 991 just before the swingers must choose pieces defined by PCPD rules (R 991-2B). Even if we don't get hung there exactly, we're indeterminate in the "beginning stage" of the game, trying to figure out exactly which darn rules to apply to that darn King. True on CFJ 240 indicates a True here.

The Court finds that R994 is not, in fact, a PCPD rule, despite its many similarities, as it fails the requirement (R990-3F) that a PCPD rule define a material value for a piece. Since the King is not defined by a PCPD rule, and R991-2B requires that the additional pieces selected by the players be defined by PCPD rules, players may not select Kings, resolving the question that was claimed to have hung the game. Note that R990-5 and R990-3H exempt the PartyChessPiece King from the requirement that pieces be defined by PCPD rules. That exemption has no bearing on the the requirement in R991-2B that additional pieces selected by players be defined by PCPD rules.

Call For Judgement 240 - Thu, 25 Jul 1996 19:19 -0400
Subject: King Paradox
Initiator: /dev/joe
Judge: ThinMan (selected Jul 24, 1996, 18:30h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

It cannot be determined with finality whether section 3 of Rule 990 applies in any way to the Party Chess Piece named King.

Subsection H of section 3 of R990 states "The only exception to section 3 of this rule is the Party Chess Piece named King." Thus section 3 does not apply to the King. However, if section 3 does not apply to the King, then the sentence "The only exception to section 3 of this rule is the Party Chess Piece named King." does not apply to the King, because it is part of section 3. But if that does not apply, then section 3 *does* apply to the King. But then it doesn't apply. But then...

This is the same sort of paradox as was seen in CFJ 184. If this CFJ is judged True, then /dev/joe wins the game by Rule 219.

I note that some part(s) of section 3 definitely do not apply to the King, because section 5 of R990 says section 3 defers entirely to rule 994. However, since Rule 994 does not claim to be a PartyChessPieceDef rule, there are very few places where the rules conflict. One clear example of a conflict (the only one?) is where R990, 3.H. says "The King is defined in a seperate section of this rule." while actually, the King is defined in Rule 994. Since there may be sections such as this which definitely do not apply, the statement of this CFJ contains the words "in any way".

I agree with /dev/joe that the sentence "The only exception [...] is the [...] King," should be interpreted to stipulate that the King is an exception to section 3 of R990. However, it does not say _how_ the King is an exception to section 3. For the most part, section 3 of R 990 does not apply to the King anyway, as it regulates PartyChessPieceDef _rules_ rather than the pieces themselves. Only three provisions of section 3 can be argued to apply to a party chess piece named King: Part E, and the two provisions of Part H. Strictly speaking, then, the King cannot be interpreted to be an exception to the other parts in any case, thus part H cannot mean that the King is an exception to every part of section 3.

How, then, is the King an exception to section 3? It is certainly the case that the King is an exception to the second provision of Part H: "The King is defined in a seperate section of this rule." It is possible that that is the only provision to which the King is an exception. The rule leaves unclear the question of whether the King is an exception to any other provision; particularly whether the King is an exception to the first provision of part H. In my judgement, it is in the Spirit of the Game that a reasonable reading of the Rules that does not produce a paradox is preferable to an otherwise similarly reasonable one that does. Therefore, it is my judgement that the first provision of of part H is not self-referential. It is therefore possible for a judge to decide whether section 3 applies in some way to the King.

It remains to be determined whether or not section 3 actually does apply in any way to the King. If the King is an exception to part E as well as to the second provision of part H, then one might argue that section 3 really doesn't apply in any way to the King. This judgement does not establish whether or not the King is an exception to section 3 part E, but that is not necessary to establish the falsehood of the statement submitted for judgement.

Call For Judgement 241 - Thu, 25 Jul 1996 22:57 -0400
Subject: Whimsical Justice
Initiator: Bascule
Judge: this is not a name (selected Jul 25, 1996, 19:33h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

I call for judgement on the following statement:

The legality of actions in statements called for CFJ that are subject to repeated whimsical judgements from the Supreme Court cannot be determined with finality.

While "All Judgements must be in accordance with all the rules then in effect" (rule 215), the legality of appeal verdicts is determined by the Supreme Court.

An "illegal" verdict (one that does not accord with the rules) from the Supreme Court cannot be illegal, since there is no higher authority that can be appealed to.

Hypothetical example:

The CFJ statement "I can return judgements at whim" is whimsically judged TRUE (when it is plainly false). The verdict is appealed to the Supreme Court, but the Supreme Court does not overturn the original verdict, despite any number of appeals.

The legality of whimsical judgements cannot be decided with finality, since they are illegal by R215, but legal according to the Supreme Court (the "keepers of the sacred laws").

Note that even if this CFJ is judged true, it will not be a win by paradox.

If the Supreme Court rules that an action is illegal, it is considered to be illegal until such time as that verdict is overturned. (And vice versa.)

There is indeed a higher authority; any justice can and should be impeached and a new one appointed if the Supreme Court disregards its mission and returns an illegal verdict.

Call For Judgement 242 - Tue, 30 Jul 1996 12:11:34 -0400
Subject: Last Party Chess Paradox, I promise
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: chess piece face (selected Jul 25, 1996, 22:25h New York Time) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: ThinMan (selected Jul 30, 1996, 00:35h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The first instance of the text, sequentially in the rules, that defines the Party Chess Piece named King cannot be determined with finality; thus the legality of actions that manipulate said King cannot be determined with finality.

I quote from the infamous R 990, section 3.H:

> The King is defined in a seperate section of this rule.

The Rules, by definition, are True. There is no such thing, in nomic, as a False rule. The best you can do is show how, amongst seemingly contradictory rules, that one has precedence, or failing that, show how a rule or rules is paradoxical, as in CFJ 184, or as in obvious cases such as "this statement is False".

It matters not if they appear False in "real life". For example, we have a rule (R 729) that states "The earth is flat". If we were to have another rule which stated: "If the earth is flat, all players receive exactly one Blue Cross, provided they do not have one", then "Real Life" Truth would not matter, only Ackanomic Truth.

If we allow the assumption, or the power, to determine that rules can be False, the game will crash instantly.

Thus, given the Truth of the above rule, what can we say with finality? That the King is defined somewhere in R 990, but not in section 3. That is all. There is more to the rule than section 3, so said text is defined elsewhere in R 990. It cannot, however, be determined with finality what that text is, exactly. I challenge the Judge to do so, from R 990.

Now, to clean up loose ends in regards to the CFJ's statement:

1) There is no text in the rules before R 990 that even mentions the Party Chess Piece named King, thus there is no text prior to 990 which defines it; thus the indeterminate definition in R 990 is the "first sequentially" in the rules.

2) The King is possibly Protected by R 592:

> All entities and actions in Ackanomic are Protected by default, unless 
> the rule(s) which specify or define their behaviour *explicitly*
> state otherwise.

Since the text is indeterminate, there may be no way to tell whether the definition of the King *explicitly* states otherwise, thus we are done because we don't know if

> [The King] may not be [...] manipulated except as specified by the Rules.

Thus the legality of certain actions of manipulation are indeterminate.

3) Even if we take a leap of faith and assume it is Protected (and you certainly can't assume it is *not* Protected, because nothing about Protection is *explicitly stated*), then you arrive at a similar deadlock:

> [The King] may not be [...] manipulated except as specified by the Rules.

The specification of the King, however, is indeterminate, therefore you do not know if any action (manipulation) is being done "as specified by the rules", because that specification is indeterminate.

A verdict of TRUE constitutes a win for the initiator by R 219. A verdict of FALSE should be accompanied by the text of the definition of the King from R 990, or the text from a lower numbered rule.

This court finds Malenkai's arguments that the Rules are "true" to be unsatisfactory. The Rules that permit and regulate judgements such as this one stipulate that Rules may be unclear or contradictory, the second of which, at least, requires that some rule or part of a rule be untrue in some way.

Moreover, Malenkai seems to be playing "fast and loose" with what he considers the scope of his truth argument. When he relies on precedence arguments he can only be referring to the truth of the ruleset as a whole; when he talks about contradictory rules he can only be talking about individual rules; and when he talks about R 990 he is talking about one single provision of one rule.

The truth of the Ruleset overall is axiomatic. When and wherever this axiom breaks down we have a paradox win. However, the truth of individual rules does not necessarily follow from the truth of the ruleset -- as Malenkai points out himself, we have rules the preserve the overall truth of the ruleset by resolving conflicts between individual rules. It is even more the case that the truth of individual provisions of rules are not guaranteed to be true.

Malenkai cites part of R990.3.H in his reasoning. I think it is appropriate to supplement that with the rest of R990.3.H: "The only exception to section 3 of this rule is the Party Chess Piece name King." As it did in CFJ 240, this court interprets that provision to mean that the King is, in fact, an exception to R990.3. The text is unclear on exactly which provisions the King is an exception to, but CFJ 240 establishes that the King is not an exception to "The only exception [...] is the [...] King."

Although it seems unusual that the King should be an exception to a provision that otherwise has no application, this court finds that to be the most consistent interpretation. It is the determination of this court that the King must be an exception to "The King is defined in a seperate section of this rule," as allowed by R990.3.H. Thus the rules do not require that the King be defined in R990, and the only definition of the King occurs in R994. The statement submitted for judgement is false.

As an added note, this judge acknowledges that he has for the most part sidestepped Malenkai's argument founded on the "truth" of the rules. I find his argument unconvincing, and submit that if there were no language in R 990 allowing the "definition clause" of R990 to be ignored, then there would be a paradox in that the definition clause would say something untrue about the rule that contained it. R 990 clearly does not contain a definition of the King, and even without the "exception clause," I reject Malenkai's line of reasoning that demands an indeterminate definition.

Call For Judgement 243 -
Subject: That Funky Monkey
Initiator: this is not a name
Judge: Pascal (selected Jul 27, 1996, 23:50h New York Time)
Retracted by this is not a name at 01:00 EDT Jul 28

Statement:

When Rule 824 is invoked, each particular player's score only changes by 5 votes, no matter how many of the 10 proposals were written by that player.

Rule 824 reads:

>     If 10 consecutive proposals are accepted, the Brass Monkey shall
>     climb the tallest building in Acka Land and proclaim --
>     "The authors of the 10 consecutive proposals that were accepted
>     shall be awarded 5 bonus points."
>     After this proclamation, the score keeper shall increment the
>     appropriate scores by 5 points.

The rule does not state specifically whether my position is correct or not. But it implies that it is correct. If player X wrote several of the proposals, e is still only an author of them once and should only receive 5 points once.

In addition, relevant to the part of the rule beginning "After this proclamation," the Scorekeeper is required to increment the appropriate scores by 5 points. If player X wrote 3 proposals, e would be entitled to 15 points if my reasoning were incorrect. But it is stated in the rule that the Scorekeeper is to increment that player's score by 5 points and 5 points only.

If this CFJ is judged true, the following score changes must be made as a correction:
-5 pTang1001001sos
-5 /dev/joe
-15 Malenkai

Call For Judgement 244 - Wed, 31 Jul 1996 23:11:12 -0400
Subject: That Funky Monkey
Initiator: this is not a name
Judge: Mellon (selected Jul 28, 1996, 01:00h New York Time) (failed to respond)
2nd Judge: Malenkai (selected Jul 31, 1996, 02:00h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

When Rule 824 is invoked, each particular player's score only changes by 5 points, no matter how many of the 10 proposals were written by that player.

Rule 824 reads:

>     If 10 consecutive proposals are accepted, the Brass Monkey shall
>     climb the tallest building in Acka Land and proclaim --
>     "The authors of the 10 consecutive proposals that were accepted
>     shall be awarded 5 bonus points."
>     After this proclamation, the score keeper shall increment the
>     appropriate scores by 5 points.

The rule does not state specifically whether my position is correct or not. But it implies that it is correct. If player X wrote several of the proposals, e is still only an author of them once and should only receive 5 points once.

In addition, relevant to the part of the rule beginning "After this proclamation," the Scorekeeper is required to increment the appropriate scores by 5 points. If player X wrote 3 proposals, e would be entitled to 15 points if my reasoning were incorrect. But it is stated in the rule that the Scorekeeper is to increment that player's score by 5 points and 5 points only.

If this CFJ is judged true, the following score changes must be made as a correction:
-5 pTang1001001sos
-5 /dev/joe
-15 Malenkai

The first question is: would it be a conflict of interest for me to accept judgement, seeing as my score would be directly affected by the verdict? The value of all scores is relative to what all other players have, so it could be argued that it would be a conflict of interest for me to judge a CFJ that would reduce, say, ThinMan's score by 15 points. Less of a conflict of interest? Is that possible? Possibly.

Furthermore, if I could derive a verdict objectively from rule of law and fact, it would not matter if it was a conflict of interest; the Rules and conscience, would require me to reach that verdict, if I saw it. So I shall at least explore the question before deciding to accept or decline.

Judgements must accord with the rules, or game custom and spirit of the game of the rules are unclear or silent. We all know that, by now.

The wording of R 824 is unclear: The following interpretations are possible:

1) (/dev/joe): Each author receives 5 points per proposal.

2) (tinan): Each distinct author receives 5 points.

3) (Malenkai): The author(s) receive, as a group, 5 points.

4) (Malenkai): No one receives any points for the consecutive passages.

This interpretation (4) is arrived at by a rather strict-constructionalist argument, inasmuch as the the way the rule is written, the event that occurs when the 10 proposals pass is not that the authors receive points, but that the Brass Monkey climbs a building and says the following:

"The authors of the 10 consecutive proposals that were accepted shall be awarded 5 bonus points."

The Brass Monkey is regulated elsewhere by R 823 and R 962.1, and neither of those rules give the Brass Monkey any authority whatsoever to change player's scores. Had the last line of R 824 not been there, I would snatch this one up like a piece of cheesecake, but as it is, I find this argument unsatisfying, but barely. I presented it on purpose, however.

tinan argues for (2) above over (1), using the following:

> But it is stated in the rule that the Scorekeeper is to increment
> that player's score by 5 points and 5 points only.

This statement is FALSE (not *this* one, the quote :)). The rule does not say that, and this Court is not amused by tinan falsely stating what is "stated" in the rule. The rule says:

> the score keeper shall increment the appropriate scores by 5 points.

This can be followed by either interpretation of (1) or (2) above, and only (1) or (2) above, without a problem, but it does not clarify or indicate an interpretation amongst them, it just eliminates (3) and (4).

I find no other rules that can clarify the situation. I next turn to the issue of game custom, specifically similar situations. The custom that comes to mind is so weak that it will not be presented. Suffice it to say it has to do with proposal *submissions*.

What other custom is there? /dev/joe interpreted the rule before tinan did. tinan challenged the interpretation within a reasonable "grace period". Thus I find that /dev/joe did not establish custom simply by "being first".

Thus I find there was *no* extant game custom at the time this unclarity arose. There will be when this is done, whenever that may be :)

The rule is simply unclear, and there is nothing lying around to clarify it.

That leaves "spirit of the game", or basically, "make a decision already".

This is where the conflict of interest issue arises again. I must decide to accept or decline at this point in my exploration of the issue, or judge UNDECIDED. If I do not return a definitive verdict, it simply becomes someone else's, or the Supreme Court's whim. If I missed something in my above reasoning, and return a bad verdict, and that "something" I missed is pointed out, it can always be appealed. If I missed nothing, and my reasoning is valid, appeal is simply transference of the problem.

So the way I see it, whether or not I return a verdict, it becomes *someone's* problem. Who's problem should it be? The Supreme Court? That was addressed above. It would be a minor conflict of interest to make it my problem, but I claim *very* minor, as per above.

I find it is the Scorekeeper's problem, and that the Scorekeeper is the most qualified and well within his rights to attempt this interpretation. In the absence of any compelling reason or evidence to overturn that interpretation, which was (1) above, the statement on which judgement was called is FALSE.

Call For Judgement 245 - Fri, 02 Aug 1996 18:12:22 -0400
Subject: Locations
Initiator: snowgod
Judge: Robin Hood (selected Jul 29, 1996, 19:20h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

A player may exist in two "locations" at the same time.

I have no real opinion on this issue I just want a judgement inserted into game custom. If a judgement of true is returned it would indicate that a player is able to reside in his ackanomic home and another location (such as the afterlife or a hotel) at simultaneously. A verdict of false should indicate that a player will reside only in the "location" to which he was most recently placed.

The rules neither explicitly prevent bilocation, nor permit it. Game custom means that, unless explicitly stated otherwise, english nouns retain their normal properties. People can only be in one place at one time so I must rule false.

Call For Judgement 246 - Fri, 02 Aug 1996 18:20:37 -0400
Subject: Party Chess
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: Brinjal (selected Jul 31, 1996, 00:24h New York Time)
Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

Party Chess is unplayable as of the date of this CFJ, and therefore the Chess-Umpire or Acting Chess-Umpire is absolved of all duties regarding the game of Party Chess until such time as its rules are modified.

There's been some private debate as to the duties of the Acting Chess-Umpire. This seems like a reasonable way to resolve the situation.

There being no pieces except Kings for the players to select, the game of Party Chess cannot progress until the rules are changed. If the game cannot progress, then the Chess-Umpire will have no duties to perform until the situation changes.

Call For Judgement 247 - Mon, 05 Aug 1996 18:33 EDT
Subject: Is This a Public Message by Me?
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: mr cwm (selected Jul 31, 1996, 21:04h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The witchhunt called on July 30, 1996, against /dev/joe was illegal.

At least one of the conditions required to call a witchhunt were met:

>From R 729:

> If, in a public message, a player refers to the Earth being round, or
> implies that this may be the case, any other player may call for a
> Witchhunt, by publically posting that they are doing so. 

The witchhunt was called in response to the following post by the Promoter to the public forum:

>Proposal 1056 - Tue Jul 30 12:44:51 EDT 1996
>I Should Be Allowed to Think
>/dev/joe  (Joseph DeVincentis)

>Repeal rule 729, "Ackanomic Middle Ages".

"If, in a public message, a player refers..."

The obvious rendering of this is that the player must have made the post themselves, and it must be their own words and expression. Under this common sense rendering, this post applies not as a public message by /dev/joe or by Wayne. I would like the Judge to clarify, once and for all, this public message business, preferably along my obvious translation :)

I personally have no opinion as to whether or not /dev/joe is a heretic, but I insist that the rules be followed.

Referring to the reasoning of CFCJ 107 (which I am well aware is partly my own), we see that a player may make a reference or implication in a public message, even though they are not the originator of the message, if they are or should be aware that their reference or implication will be reported in a public message, even if it is not quoted directly. There are many ways a player may make reference or implication in a public message, without posting the message themself. Newspaper interviews come to mind, and voting results were dealt with in CFCJ 107. Proposals fit into this scheme - although the players do not post proposals themselves, they should be aware that the references and implications within them will be posted publicly.

Thus, the conditions required for the legal call for a witchhunt were fulfilled in this case, prompting a decision of FALSE.

Call For Judgement 248 -
Due to an error on the part of the Clerk of the Court, there was no CFJ 248.

Call For Judgement 249 - Fri, 02 Aug 1996 18:17:12 -0400
Subject: Interpreting R 514
Initiator: Malenkai
Judge: /dev/joe (selected Aug 01, 1996, 00:51h New York Time) (declined to judge)
2nd Judge: this is not a name (selected Aug 01, 1996, 01:17h New York Time) (declined to judge)
3rd Judge: ThinMan (selected Aug 01, 1996, 01:59h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE

Statement:

The term "Player", as used in R 514 section (ii), refers to a Player who is a party to a Contract, as used in R 514 section (i), and thus the behaviours regulated by a Contract are not enforceable upon any player who is not party to the Contract, regardless of what the Contract says.

I hope that's a single statement. I'll let the judge worry about the reasoning. I can't stop laughing.

BURN THE WITCH TWICE !!

R 514 does not contain any language that would restrict its usage of the word Player in section (ii). This court acknowledges that such may well have been the intent of the Rule, but that is no ground for a judgement.

Other unqualified usages of the term Player in the rules have rightly been interpreted as "any Player," and this court sees no reason why the term should not be interpreted the same way in R514.

I note that there is some question as to whether any player is legally bound by any provision of any contract. The question here hinges upon the interpretation of "Enforceable." Rules 514 and 551 seem to use an internal definition of that term, which may mean that its conventional English interpretation is not applicable. I think I will CFJ that. The answer to that question is not germane to the resolution of the present CFJ, however.

Call For Judgement 250 - Thu, 08 Aug 1996 18:43 EDT
Subject: Contracts I
Initiator: ThinMan
Judge: Habeous Corpus (selected Aug 02, 1996, 18:44h New York Time)
Judgement: FALSE at Sat, 03 Aug 1996 14:45:11 -0400
Appealed by ThinMan at Sun, 4 Aug 1996 18:10:36 -0500
Supreme Court's Judgement: TRUE

Statement:

The rules do not require players to abide by the provisions of contracts.

A contract is not a rule, therefore the provisions of a contract can only be legally binding if the rules say that they are. No rule explicitly makes the provisions of a contract be legally binding. Rule 551, on the other hand, makes specific provision for cases in which the provisions of a Rule are not or cannot be adhered to by those to whom the provisions apply. This implies that it is possible for Players to not abide by the provisions of a contract, and hence that not abiding by contract provisions is within the rules (although it may carry consequences).

There is also the question of "Enforceability." To my knowledge, this concept appears only in rules 514, 551, and 607 among all the rules. R 514 section (ii) seems to comprise a definition of "Enforceable" for use in that and other rules. If we accept R 514, section (ii) as a definition, then any other interpretation of the word, including the conventional English-language one, is inapplicable to contracts. If we must look elsewhere for a relevant definition of "enforceable" then English-language convention is the obvious choice, but it is not clear to me how that interpretation of the word applies to Ackanomic.

Rule 514(v) states, in part:
"A Player may call for the enforcement of a behavior regulated by an Enforcable Contract. In such a case it is the duty of the appropriate Officers to see to it that the Contract is enforced."

This ensures that if a party to the contract attempts to "not abide" by, or violate , a provision of the contract, the behavior required by the contract will be carried out anyway. [note: this seems to obviate a CFCJ in that since the required action(s) took place despite a Players attempt to do otherwise. No violation of Rule 101 will have actually occurred]

Since the Player's behavior is modifiable to ensure compliance, the Player can be made to abide by the provisions of a valid contract even if e attempts to do otherwise; therefore, this statement is judged to be FALSE.

Habeous Corpus based his judgement of FALSE on CFJ 250 on R 514, section (v), which allows a player to "call for enforcement" of a contract, and that it is the duty of the "appropriate officer" to see that the contract is "enforced." HC interpreted this to mean that Player actions may be changed by the application of this rule.

HC has apparently rejected my argument that R 514 _defines_ "Enforceable" with respect to contracts, as this argument surely renders his argument and verdict invalid. I ask the Supreme Court to reconsider my case. However, even if the Court agrees with HC on that point, I ask it to delve more deeply into the English definition of "Enforceable" that HC ostensibly used.

"Law-enforcement" does not consist of changing people's past actions, nor of forcing particular actions. It consists of catching and punishing lawbreakers and of protecting people from illegal actions against them. This concept is more-or-less foreign to Ackanomic, hence the comment in my original reasoning questioning how the English-language definition of "enforceable" was applicable to Ackanomic. However it may apply to Ackanomic, that definition can in no way be construed to require players to abide by the provisions of a contract; rather, it establishes that penalties for not doing so may be applied. R551 defines those penalties.

Perhaps the greatest flaw in HC's argument, however, is summed up by the final paragraph of his reasoning. He argues that because a player's behavior _can_ be made to comply with a contract (a position I believe to be in error), the CFJ statement is false. HC's statement, however, also implicitly allows that the player's behavior might not be made to comply (if no-one calls for Enforcement). How, then, do the Rules _require_ that a player abide by the provisions of the contract?

The Supreme Court finds Thinman's reasoning to be sound, especially (1) the argument that the explicit definintion of a term within the Rules sets the meaning of the term for Ackanomic, regardless of its customary English interpretation, and (2) the argument that if no call for Enforcement is made, a player will have successfully and legally not abided by the provisions of a contract. The rules do not require a player to abide by the terms of a contract to which they are party; they define a means by which another player may enforce compliance, if they desire it.